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WHY JUDGES APPLYING THE DAUBERT
TRILOGY NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
THE SOCIAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND
RHETORICAL-AND NOT JUST
THE METHODOLOGICAL-
ASPECTS OF SCIENCE
DAVID S. CAUDILL* & LEWIS H. LARUE**
Abstract: In response to the claim that many judges are deficient in their
understanding of scientific methodology, this Article identifies in recent
cases (1) a pragmatic perspective on the part of federal appellate judges
when they reverse trial judges who tend to idealize science (i.e., who do
not appreciate the local and practical goals and limitations of science),
and (ii) an educational model of judicial gatekeeping that results in
reversal of trial judges who defer to the social authority of science (i.e.,
who mistake authority for reliability). Next, this Article observes that
courts (in the cases it analyzes) are not interested in pragmatically
constructing legal science, but rather attempt to ensure that science itself,
conceived pragmatically (i.e., without idealizing science), is appropriated
in law. This Article concludes that trial judges who fail to appreciate the
social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of science tend to reject
reliable—albeit pragmatic—science, welcome unreliable—albeit author-
itative—science, and thereby create a body of legal science that is out of
sync with mainstream science.
INTRODUCTION
[MJany of the luminaries of physics, from Bohr and Heisenberg on down,
took the radical step of denying the existence of an independently existing
physical world altogether, and, sutprisingly, got away with it. In other; i.e.
nonscientific, contexts, the difference between those who are committed to an
independently existing reality and those who are not is roughly emulated
with the distinction between the sane and the psychotic.'
* Professor of Law and Alumni Faculty Fellow, Washington and Lee University School
of Law
** Class of 1958 Alumni Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
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In Rebecca Goldstein's popular novel about quantum physicists,
her protagonist Justin Childs is enraged by the "nonsense ... that
measurement creates reality, so that it is simply meaningless to ask what's going
on when no measurement is taking place. " 2
 Later in the story, however, he
learns (from his mentor, who failed in his objectivist challenge to
Bohr and Heisenberg) something about the way science works:
[T] he last thing in the world I ever expected was to be ig-
nored.... I thought that it was only the objective merits of
the work itself that mattered, especially in science. If not in
science, then where else? ... I didn't know how things really
work ... , how it gets decided what should be paid attention
to .... The big shots decide and the little shots just march
lock-stepped into line.5
These brief literary representations capture what is going on nowa-
days in the so-called "science wars" 4—on one side are the believers in
science as an enterprise that reports on natural reality, or at least suc-
cessfully represents nature with models that correspond to reality; on
the other side are those who view science as a social, rhetorical, and
institutional enterprise that only manages to convince us that it deals
in natural reality. Because the latter position—that "reality" is con-
structed (not discovered) by scientists—is so counterintuitive, it
sounds nonsensical, almost psychotic, to believers in science. And yet,
if the social, institutional, and rhetorical structures of the scientific
enterprise, rather than "nature," effectively determine what gets "paid
attention to,"5
 then reality as we know it is to some extent constructed.
Does this academic debate among philosophers, historians, and
sociologists of science really matter? After all, science progresses with-
out regard to the science wars, and scientists are likely oblivious to the
concerns of social constructivists, who do not seem to be providing use-
ful insights to the scientific enterprise. We will argue, however, that the
2 Id. at 38-39.
3 Id. a t 69.
4
 The term "science wars" refers to "the ever angrier debate about the scope and
authority of science." You Can't Follow the Science Mrs Without a Battle Map, EcoNomis•r,
Dec. 13, 1997, at 77, 77. The "battle" is between the defenders of science as a linear and
progressive affair involving testable and falsifiable descriptions of reality, and critics of
science who emphasize its historical, social, rhetorical, political, and even moral and gen-
dered aspects. See id. at 77-78.
3 GOLDSTEIN, suptn note 1, at 69.
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science wars are significant for law—the issues raised in that debate
provide insights as to what trial judges need to know about science to
carry out their gatekeeping role with respect to proffered expert testi-
mony. Moreover, the position a judge takes, perhaps unwittingly, with
respect to the status and authority of science, actually matters: cases are
often won or lost on the basis of scientific evidence, and appeals are so
costly that a trial judge's understanding of science is often determinative.
Given the privileged position of science in law as a stabilizer of le-
gal disputes, one might assume that in the regime created by the "Dau-
ber! Trilogy, " the courtroom is closely aligned (with respect to the sci-
ence wars) with the believers in science. 6 Indeed, some commentators
have suggested that after the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Dauber, v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., "the legal culture must as-
similate the scientific culture;" 7 Michael Saks has even suggested that
admissibility decisions as to most scientific evidence should be treated
as matters of law—the facts of science have "quite a trans-case and law-
like nature."8 Such comments suggest that expertise is grounded in real-
ity, and is decidedly not a matter of rhetoric or "social construction."
Courts should therefore, from this vantage, defer to science. Con-
versely, some commentators suggest that science is just another cultural
activity, like law, such that deference is not appropriate; the law can and
should construct its own legal "science," which need not be considered
inferior—because mainstream science is also a construction. 9 In a simi-
lar formulation, some argue that scientific knowledge is reconstructed
and framed in court, where the scientific method is a "representational
device" that, like other "normative images" (for example, general ac-
ceptance, or peer review and publication), "are better understood as ex
post facto explanations and a professional rhetoric.'" The science wars,
it appears, have arrived in legal discourse.
In our view, the science wars present a false dichotomy to which
the law should not submit. Believers in science idealize the scientific
6 The "Daubert Trilogy" consists of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); and Kuntho Tire Co. v. Car-
michael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
7 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN El' AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, at ix (1997), See generally 509 U.5. 579.
8 Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving futisprudence of Expert Evidence,
40 JuatmETRics J. 229, 232-33 (2000).
9 See Margaret Farrell, Dattbert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology and
Legal Process, 15 CARnozo L. REV. 2183, 2217 (1994).
10 See Gary Edmond, Judicial Representations of Scientific Evidence, 63 Mon. L. REV. 216,
217,250-51 (2000).
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enterprise to a degree that the inevitable social, institutional, and rhe-
torical aspects of science—its pragmatic features—are neither ac-
knowledged nor discussed. Legal commentary on the Daubert Trilogy
is dominated by such idealization," thereby marginalizing social stud-
ies of science in legal scholarship. 12 Oddly, however, although social
constructivists do not idealize science, they do idealize the social, insti-
tutional, and rhetorical aspects of science to a degree that the suc-
cesses of science are either ignored or eclipsed. Neither option is par-
ticularly attractive, which leads many philosophers and social analysts
to conclude that science is both productive of knowledge about the
world and a social, institutional, and rhetorical enterprise.
Commenting on the origins of Western science, anthropologist
Johannes Fabian has written that historically:
Western science derives from an earlier art of rhetoric,
chronologically (i.e., with regard to the sequence of devel-
opments in our tradition), as well as systematically (regard-
ing the nature of scientific activity). Paul Feyerabend goes as
far as declaring that propaganda belongs to the essence of
science, a view also held, but less outrageously formulated,
by T. S. Kuhn in his theory of scientific paradigms. Far from
dismissing science as mere rhetoric—a hopeless attempt in
view of its practical and technological triumphs—this posi-
tion states the obvious fact that all sciences, including the
most abstract and mathematized disciplines, are social en-
deavors which must be carried out through the channels and
means, and according to the rules, of communication avail-
able to a community of practitioners . . . . 13
Although that perspective does not represent either extreme in the
science wars—it does not sufficiently idealize either science or social
determinants—recent fieldwork in the public understanding of sci-
" See generally David S. Caudill, Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of Science in Law,
39 SAN DIEGO L. Rev. 269 (2002).
12 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evi-
dence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1492 & n.1 (2001) (dismissing 'the unfortunate fascination in
some quarters of the legal academy with 'postmodern' conceptions of knowledge and
truth, conceptions notable for their superficiality and for the fact that almost no philoso-
phers subscribe to them"; postmodern skepticism 'about the possibility of objective truth,
as well as our capacity to find objective truth in the world," is "remarkably useless for evi-
dence law"). Allen and Leiter's outlook is, perhaps, remarkable for its dismissiveness.
nionANNEs FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: How ANTHROPOLOGY MARES ITS OBJECT
109 (1983) (footnote omitted).
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ence confirms that "May attitudes towards science, technology and
other esoteric forms of expertise ... tend to express the same mixed
attitudes of reverence and reserve, approval and disquiet, enthusiasm
and antipathy, which [many) philosophers and social analysts ... ex-
press in their writings." 4 Even more surprising than the fact that the
public's reaction to science is mixed is our finding that many federal
judges are just like the "public": (i) more willing to view science as an
enterprise with local and practical goals and limitations, therefore (ii)
less willing to idealize or defer to science than are the believers in sci-
ence (in the science wars), but (iii) nevertheless willing to appropri-
ate science, as a pragmatic enterprise, when it is a reliable producer of
useful knowledge.
In Part I of this Article, we enter the discourse of what judges
need to know about science by reference to (and criticism of) the re-
cent survey concluding that gate-keeping judges are deficient in their
understanding of scientific methodology." In Part H, while observing
the occasional lapse in methodological understandings, we identify in
recent cases a particular pragmatic perspective among many federal
appellate judges; that pragmatic perspective is further elucidated by
our analysis of cases in which trial judges tended to idealize science."
These trial judges were reversed because they were too strict and did
not appreciate the practical goals and limitations of science. In Part
III, we introduce the parallel notion that in the Dauber, Trilogy, the
U.S. Supreme Court adopted an educational, rather than a deferen-
tial, model of judicial gatekeeping; we then demonstrate that some
appellate judges in recent cases recognize that the social authority of
expertise can often become disengaged from its reliability, thus
confirming that they are not idealizing science.r These appellate
judges reversed trial judges who were too lenient due to their idealiza-
tion of scientific authority. In Part IV, we observe that courts (in the
cases we analyze) are not interested in pragmatically constructing legal
science, but rather attempt to ensure that science itself, conceived
pragmatically (i.e., without idealizing science), is appropriated in
14 See ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN THE
LATE. MODERN AGE 7 (1991), quoted in Alan Irwin & Brian Wynne, Conclusions, in MISUN-
DERSTANDING SCIENCE?: THE PUBLIC RECONSTRUCTION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 213,
219 (Alan Irwin & Brian Wynne eds., 1996) thereinafter MISUNDERSTANDING SCIENCE)
(noting that scientific "claims to authority are likely to be met with an increasingly critical
(if not downright hostile) audience" in public contexts).
15 See infra notes 20-71 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 72-152 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 153-220 and accompanying text.
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law. 18
 Part V explores this apparent breakdown of the methodologi-
cal/social dichotomy—which dichotomy persists in legal scholarship's
version of the science wars—in recent federal jurisprudence. 19 We
conclude that trial judges who fail to understand and appreciate the
social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of science tend to (i) reject
reliable, albeit pragmatic, science, (ii) welcome unreliable, but
authoritative, science, and (iii) thereby create a body of legal science
that is out of sync with mainstream science.
I. WHAT Do JUDGES NEED TO KNOW?
Survey results demonstrate that . . . . many of the judges surveyed lacked
the scientific literacy seemingly necessitated by Daubert [v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.] . 20
A. The "Deficit Model" offudicial Understanding
The ongoing discourse concerning what judges need to know
about science in order to evaluate the admissibility of expert testi-
mony2 I is premised on the notion that the Daubed Trilogy has been
problematic—"judges have difficulty operationalizing the Daubert cri-
teria and applying them," which highlights "the potential for inconsis-
tent application of the Daubert guidelines."22
 Indeed, the very nature
of the Dan bert "revolution" seems to be a matter of serious disagree-
ment among the 400 state trial court judges who were recently inter-
viewed for an article entitled Asking the Gatekeepers:
One third of the judges surveyed . . . believed that the in-
tent of Dan bert was to raise the threshold of admissibility for
scientific evidence, whereas 23% ... believed that the intent
was to lower the threshold .... Just over one-third ... be-
lieved that the intent ... was to neither raise nor lower the
18 See infra notes 221-227 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 228-235 and accompanying text.
28 Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging
Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW. & HUM. &Bay. 433,433 (2001) (surveying
400 state trial court judges).
21
 See, e.g., id. at 434; see also Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Prue-
ess: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563,1564-68 (2000).
24 Gatowski et al., supra note 20, at 452-53.
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threshold .... The remaining judges (11% 	 ) were uncer-
tain as to the Supreme Court's intention. 23
As to science itself, the same survey indicated that most judges lack a
clear understanding of "falsifiability" and "error rate," leading the
authors to conclude that judges "need to be trained to be critical con-
sumers of the science that comes before them."24
Provincially speaking, of course, judges need to know more about
everything, including science. The authors of the aforementioned sur-
vey, nevertheless, have produced a striking picture of confusion in the
wake of Daubert.25 The blame, according to the survey authors, lies
partly with the Daubert opinion (and the Court's failure to provide
guidance as to the gatekeeping role), and partly with judges who gen-
erally lack scientific literacy. 26 Offering scientific training for judges
impliedly solves both problems because an understanding of science
makes the Daubert guidelines clear (assuming the Daubert guidelines
represent science).
From the perspective of those who do fieldwork in the public un-
derstanding of science, this recent survey is typical of the "deficit
model" in traditional, quantitative studies.27 Science is presumed, in
such research, to be secure and measurable "knowledge" that the igno-
rant "public" lacks and needs—the remedy is usually conceived to be
more science education. This conception re-invokes the image of "cog-
nitive content" to be delivered into a repository characterized by its so-
cial or communal features.28 More recent interpretationist, qualitative
23 Id. at 443.
24 Id. at 444-47, 455.
23 See generally Gatowski et al., supra note 20.
26 Id. at 437 ("[T]he Court provided little if any guidance as to the meaning or appli-
cation of the [Daubert] guidelines."); id. at 454-55 ("ETJ he research presented herein
clearly demonstrates the need for more science-based judicial education.").
27 See Simon Locke, The Public Understanding of Science—A Rhetorical Invention, 27 Sci.,
TECH., & HUM. VALUES 87, 87 (2002) ("Much of the debate in the field has focused on
the validity of the so-called deficit model The term deficit reflects an expectation that
members of the public are relatively ignorant of science and that these instruments help to
establish the extent of their knowledge deficit." (citations omitted)); see also Mike Michael,
comprehension, Apprehension, Prehension: Heterogeneity and the Public Understanding of Science,
27 Sci., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 357, 359 (2002) (noting that the positivist, traditional ori-
entation "has been criticized as deploying a deficit model").
23 See Mike Michael, Ignoring Science: Discourses of Ignorance in the Public Understanding of Sci-
ence, in MISUNDERSTANDING SCIENCE, supra note 14, at 107, 109 (In recommendations "that
there should be an increase in the amount and quality of science education," there is an
implication that "science is the active disseminator and the fountain of meaning and agency,
[and that] the public are merely the passive receivers and repositories."); see also Brian
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fieldwork indicates that the public "uptake" of science involves two
communities—(i) the scientific enterprise and (ii) the local "public"
being advised—each of which possess "socially grounded, conditional
and value-laden" knowledge. 29
 The public, these studies have shown, is
not simply "ignorant," but also suspicious about the interests of scien-
tists, and aware of scientific controversies, inconsistencies, and errors. 3°
This "critically reflective" model of the public understanding of science
is an attempt to identify the social relations of trust and credibility that
affect the public reception of scientific knowledge. Judges not trained
in science, who are used to seeing experts disagree, are more like the
"public" than like amateur scientists, and their relationship with science
is more complex than the deficit model, exemplified in the recent sur-
vey, suggests.
B. Revisiting the Survey
I. The Basic Agenda of the Survey Authors
How does one determine what judges are doing with the Daubert
Trilogy?" And how does one assess how well they are doing it? Of
course, the second question (evaluation) cannot be asked until the
first is answered, and so it is sensible to begin by trying to find out the
empirical facts: What are the judges doing? Of course, finding such
facts is not easy, but scholars have a duty to inquire, to attempt to dis-
cover what is happening. The six scholars who reported their findings
in Asking the Gatekeepers made one such attempt to find the empirical
facts of the matter by asking judges what they do. 32
 In the course of
this Article, we will be highly critical of that study: we think that the
six asked the wrong questions, and furthermore, we think that the
basic methodology of their survey is flawed. Yet even though we are
critical, we think that the study is important, because we also think
that the views presented in that study represent an important posi-
tion, one that has some social power. And because we think those
powerful views are erroneous, we wish to take them seriously.
Wynne, Misunderstood Misunderstandings: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science, in MISUN-
DERSTANDING SCIENCE, supra note 14, at 19, 19 (discussing science as 'cognitive content").
29 See Wynne, supra note 28, at 37-38.
See Michael, supra note 28, at 119-20; Wynne, supra note 28, at 26.
91 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
92 See generally Gatowski et al., supra note 20.
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In order to ask judges what they are doing, one must proceed in
a systematic way, and the six scholars that we wish to confront cer-
tainly satisfy the requirement of proceeding systematically. They de-
scribe their methodology with admirable clarity." First, they used the
standard sources to generate a representative sample of the judiciary.
Their sample is what statisticians would call a "stratified random sam-
ple," and we ,agree that using a stratified sample, rather than using a
simpler sampling technique, was the correct way to proceed. 34 As they
state, by using a stratified sample they were able to ensure that their
sample was "representative of [both] geographical distribution of
judges and levels of court." 33
The six also Fe-tested their survey instrument, which is a stan-
dard precaution. They tried it out on fOcus groups of judges who were
attending classes at the National Judicial College and the Judicial
Studies Program. As it turns out, the preliminary version of the survey
ruffled the feathers of the judges because they thought they were be-
ing "tested."" Of course, the judicial reaction was accurate; the whole
point of the survey was to test how well the judges understood their
job. On the face of the survey, it was a simple empirical inquiry; but a
fair reading of the study will reveal that the six do not wish merely to
report on what judges are. doing; they also wish to evaluate judicial
performance. But discretion is often wise, and so the six revised their
survey questions to make them more diplomatic.
The next step was to try to get the sample of judges to cooperate.
To do this, the six proceeded in a sensible way. They sent out an intro-
ductory letter then followed up by a phone call. In the phone call, the
agenda was to persuade the judges to participate in an interview and to
schedule an interview if the persuasion was successful. For the most
part, it appears that the persuasion and the scheduling went well. 37
The tricky part of the process was to train the interviewers how to
ask the questions and how to code the answers. Asking the questions
was no simple matter. Of necessity, the questions were open-ended,
and so the interviewers had a difficult task. Depending on what the
" See id. at 438-41.
34 Stratified random sampling involves dividing the population to be sampled into
strata to achieve an approximate balance of important characteristics and then using ran-
dom sampling within each of these strata. See B.S. Evrarrr, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY
or STATISTICS 321 (1998).
Gatowski et al., supra note 20, at 439.
" Id.
37 See id. at 440.
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answer was, different sorts of follow-up questions were appropriate.
We recognize that it is extremely difficult to execute well the compli-
cated agenda that the six set for themselves in the conduct of the in-
terviews and the coding of the answers, and we do not wish to quibble
about administrative details. We are quite confident that we could do
no better. Our criticisms of their study do not go to the technical de-
tails of administration. We wish to criticize the questions they asked,
not the details of how well they asked these questions.
2. Asking the Wrong Question
The question that the six authors address in their survey is: How
well do the judges understand the Daubert criteria?" As two of the
four criteria, peer review and general acceptance, do not cause any-
one any problems, the survey reduces to the question: Do judges un-
derstand the concepts of falsifiability and error rate? Because we think
there is a subtle but important error here, let us quote a key passage
from the study:
In order [for a judge's responses] to be coded as "judge under-
stands concept" for any Daubert criterion, the judge had to refer
to the central scientific meaning of the concept. For example,
with respect to falsifiability, in order for a response to be coded
as "judge understands concept," the judge's response had to
make explicit reference to testability, test and disproof, prove
wrong a theory or hypothesis, or proof/disproof. 39
On the face of the matter, perhaps nothing seems radically wrong
with the quotation, but we wish to argue that the six are proceeding in
the wrong way. To begin, one should note that the project proceeds on
the assumption that there is such a thing as "the central scientific
meaning" of the relevant concepts, which seems to us a highly oversim-
plified view of science. Although scientists do adhere to the ideal of
falsifiability, the actual concrete meaning of this difficult concept varies
across time and across disciplines.40 As we understand it, no scientist
" See id. at 435.
39 Id. at 441.
40 See Michael Mulkay & G. Nigel Gilbert, Putting Philosophy to Work: Karl Popper's
Influence on Scientific Practice, 11 PHIL, Soc. Set. 389, 398 (1981). Mulkay and Gilbert argue
that:
assessments of conformity to Popper's basic rule of scientific method hinge
on scientists' interpretation of the term "falsification"; and the meaning of
"falsification" depends entirely on researchers' technical and scientific judg-
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would argue that falsifiability is not a crucial concept, and yet one can
observe (if one only looks) that scientists disagree vehemently at times
about whether a particular hypothesis has or has not been falsified.
The next point to make is that the six are proceeding on the as-
sumption that the judges somehow lack essential knowledge if they do
not understand the concept of falsifiability the way that the six under-
stand it. Again, we refer to this assumption as the "deficit model."4 l
Those who believe in the deficit model postulate an ideal science and
all non-scientists are assumed to be defective to the degree that they
do not understand this scientific ideal. But how can one be defective
for not understanding the ideal concept if the actual practice of sci-
ence departs from the idealistic norm? 42 As we have already pointed
out, when one looks at the actual practice of science, one sees pro-
found disagreements over whether particular hypotheses have or have
not been falsified. Is this evidence that scientists themselves under-
stand the concept in different ways?
We imagine that the six might respond to these two criticisms in
ways that many will find cogent, for example: We six understand that
the concept of falsifiability is applied in different ways, but the con-
ments. In situations of scientific uncertainty these judgments, and hence the
meaning of Popperian rules, will be variable. Consequently, when there is un-
certainty, the Popperian rules cannot provide a straightforward guide for sci-
entists' actions or decisions. There is a gap between [the] rule and particular
action which can only be bridged by the very scientific choice which the rule
is intended to constrain.
Id. In another formulation, they state that:
[t]he generality of the Popperian rules [like the "falsification" criterion],
their lack of interpretive particularization and their independence of institu-
tionalized social relationships, allow individual scientists considerable free-
dom to conceive of their own actions as Popperian in character and to attrib-
ute their intellectual success to the effectiveness of the Popperian approach.
Id. at 407. As to the uses and misuses of Popper's falsifiability criterion in law, see generally
Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Conjectures and Exhumations: Citations of History, Philosophy
and Sociology of Science in US Federal Courts, 14 Law & LIIERATURE 309 (2002). Edmond and
Mercer emphasize "the degree of confidence invested by the [Dalt bert] majority in their
Popperian inspired model of the scientific method [namely, the "falsification" criterion]
and the absence, not only of conflicting and critical readings of Popper but of other phi-
losophers and sociologists of science." Id. at 313.
41 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
42 "Much of the cognitive research on scientific thinking has focused on particular cogni-
tive activities such as falsification of hypotheses and noted that even scientists often fail to
reason in a normatively correct manner (that is assuming the norms are correct!)." Kevin N.
Dunbar, Understanding the Role of Cognition iti Science: The Science as Category Framework in
THE COGNITIVE BASIS or SCIENCE 154, 165 (Peter Carruthers et al. eds., 2002).
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cept itself is not meaningless, even when it is abstract." Assuming that
they would say something like this, we willingly agree. "And we six
think that we have captured the abstract meaning of the concept."
Once again, we are happy to agree. But notice where this leaves the
debate. All agree on the abstract meaning (which the six capture rea-
sonably well). The disagreements are in the application. If this is a fair
statement of the matter, then one must notice that the real work is
being done at the moment the concept is applied. And .if the real
work is done when the concept is applied, then one must consider the
following question: Are all applications of the concept equally good?
We will assume that we and the six would agree on a"negative answer
to this question. Some scientists are better than others. Some apply
the concept of falsifiability with more insight that others do.
If one can agree with us that the most important understanding
of a concept is demonstrated by one's skill in applying it, then per-
haps one can agree with us that the six have made a fundamental mis-
take in the design of their empirical inquiry. They ask whether judges
understand such concepts as falsifiability, yet they are satisfied to
evaluate that understanding with no more evidence than the judges'
abstract statements of what the concept means; they do not try to ob-
serve how the judges apply the concept in court.
Could the six offer the response that the judges could not possi-
bly apply the concept well if they do not at least understand the ab-
stract meaning? We do not believe that this is a good response. Our
first objection to this response is to remind the reader of the social
context in which the judge operates—judges perform their tasks in a
courtroom, not in a study or a laboratory. At trial, the judge would
never apply the concept unaided. and singly. An expert would testify
that a theory being used is truly scientific because it is both falsifiable
and has not yet been falsified. The judge would have the benefit of
the expert's explanation of this thesis. Furthermore, the expert's ex-
planation would be tested by cross-examination and by the testimony
of other experts, who might agree, qualify, or disagree. So the relevant
question is not whether a judge can understand the concept unaided,
but whether the judge can respond appropriately to disputes over
falsifiability when aided by what happens in court. We see no reason
to assume that there would be other than a totally random correlation
between abstract understanding prior to trial and the concrete under-
standing that would follow a trial.
Our second objection to the response that abstract knowledge is
necessary is that even outside the courtroom such an assumption is
false. We rest our objection on the well-known distinction between
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"knowing how" and "knowing that," To take a trivial example, most
healthy children are able to learn how to ride a bicycle. But what do
they know when they know how to ride a bike? The healthy child does
not know that, nor do we, nor do the six, we expect. It takes a highly
trained scientific mind to gain an abstract knowledge of the facts of
bike riding. Furthermore, the example is not off the point merely be-
cause it involves a physical skill. Intellectual skills have the same qual-
ity, and for them too, one can know how to do something without
knowing what it is that one knows. Merely because one is a highly
skilled trial lawyer does not mean that one has a conscious intellectual
understanding of what it is that one knows. Indeed, we understand
that one of the major research projects in cognitive psychology is to
understand precisely what it is that people know when they know how
to do all of the things that they are able to do. 43
For all of these reasons, we think that the six survey authors have
asked the wrong questions. But their fundamental error, for the pur-
poses of this Article, is that they have constructed an abstract ideal of
science and then have used that abstraction to criticize what is done
with science in the courtroom. Our fundamental disagreement is that
one should not start by making this mistake.
3. Getting the Law Right
We have set forth above our objections to the methodology that
the survey authors use in their study of the judges' understanding of
science; we would like next to point out the mistakes that we think
they make about the law. Recall that their study purports to test
whether the judges know enough about scientific methodology to
administer the Dauber! . test. But the study will be misconceived if they
misunderstand the law established by Daubert. We think that they do
misunderstand the law, and so we wish now to establish this thesis.
We begin with a scruple about terminology: We do not like the
term, "the Dauber! criteria." Instead, we prefer to refer to "the Dauber!
43 See, e.g., GILLES FAUCONNIER & MARK TURNER, THE WAY WE THINK: CONCEPTUAL
BLENDING AND THE MIND'S HIDDEN COMPLEXITIES 21 (2002) ("Most motions that the
skier can imagine are impossible or undesirable to execute. But within the conceptual
blend prompted by the instructor [for example, "pushing off," "skating." or "carrying a
tray"], and under the conditions afforded by the environment, the desired motion will be
emergent."); see also STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND
3 (2001) ("Much of what we know is at the level of tacit knowledge. We can ride bicycles,
compose new sentences, and make complex judgments about all sorts of everyday things
without conscious effort or thought.").
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Trilogy." We think that it is an error to focus single-mindedly on the
lead case in this trilogy because we believe that such a focus gives an
undue emphasis to the four factors announced in Justice Blackmun's
1993 opinion.44 There are clues in Blackmun's opinion that one
should not overemphasize the four factors, and the subsequent cases
in the trilogy make it clear that the caveats should be taken just as se-
riously as the four factors. Anyone who overemphasizes the four fac-
tors will have an overly simplistic view of the relevant legal principles.
The ignored caveats begin in the paragraph in Daubert that pref-
aces the discussion of the four factors. After stating that the trial judge
must determine two things, "whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid" and "whether that rea-
soning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue,"
Blackmun goes on to write two sentences that are not quoted often
enough: "Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not pre-
sume to set out a definitive checklist or test. But some general obser-
vations are appropriate. Ordinarily ... ." 45 Here Blackmun begins list-
ing the four factors, starting with testability. 46
We think that this language is important. Take it in reverse order.
Consider the word "ordinarily." The most plausible meaning of the
word is that the factors apply in some, but not all, cases. The word
"ordinarily" begins the paragraph that discusses testability, and so in
context, one can read this first factor (or the four as a group) as dis-
pensable in some cases, Consider also the phrase, "general observa-
tions." Are we to discern the meaning of this sentence by contrasting
"general" with "specific"? A plausible reading is that Blackmun means
to establish general principles as distinguished from specific rules,
and yet the six tend to treat the criterion of testability as though it
were a specific rule that trial judges must administer.
Finally, note carefully the first sentence quoted above. 47 We are
told that "many factors" will bear on the determination that there is
valid science that was properly applied. Furthermore, we are told that
the list of four factors that follow are not "a definitive checklist or
test."48 We find it hard to imagine hoW Blackmun could have sent a
clearer signal that one should not focus obsessively on the list of four
44 The four factors are testability, peer review or publication, low error rate, and gen-
eral acceptance. Daubed, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
45 Id. at 592-93.
48 See id. at 593.
47 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
48 Id. at 593 ("[W] e do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.").
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factors. And one may recall that after the four factors are listed, Black-
mun returned to this theme by reiterating that the "inquiry ... is ... a
flexible one."49 Given all of this, there would seem to be no grounds for
complaining that the four factors are not specific or precise. Of course
they are not, which is precisely what Blackmun intended.%)
We do not wish to be ill tempered in this complaint, as in law re-
view commentary it is customary practice to take language from a ju-
dicial opinion and treat it as though it were intended to be definitive.
Many of these articles proceed hypothetically. If one takes the lan-
guage quite literally, what would the consequences be? Such a hypo-
thetical inquiry can have considerable value, although it runs the risk
of becoming irrelevant. Judges regularly refuse to be tied down by
their own words. They retroactively reinterpret what they have said to
avoid inconvenient consequences. One cannot wish away inconven-
ient language in a statute, but judges do wish away words they them-
selves have written.
At any rate, however one reads Blackmun's initial statement of
the four factors, when one reads the entire Daubert Trilogy it becomes
clear that his caveats are in fact important. Consider, for example,
how one puts together two assertions in Blackmun's opinion that
seem to be inconsistent. Blackmun writes that the trial judge must
"focus ... solely on principles and methodology, not on ... conclu-
sions,"" and yet he also states that whether the "methodology prop-
erly can be applied to the facts in issue" is a matter that the judge
must decide. 52 We think that one can conclude only one thing: these
two sentences do not go well together. So how is this apparent incon-
sistency to be resolved?
In .1997, in General Electric Co. V. joiner, the second case in the tril-
ogy, the Supreme Court resolved the tension in favor of the "applica-
49 See id. at 594.
" Significantly, the six authors of the survey we are criticizing did recognize (i) that the
Daubert Court did not intend to set out a definitive checklist or test"; (ii) that "the Dauber'
majority explicitly declined to decide whether its four factors were either necessary or
sufficient components for an adequate assessment of the scientific method"; and (iii) that a
Rule 702 inquiry is flexible. See Gatowski et al., supra note 20, at 436-37. Our criticism, there-
fore, is that the survey authors then proceed, somewhat contradictorily, to treat the Daubert
factors as definitive guidelines by' which we can determine whether judges understand sci-
ence.
61 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595,
52 1d. at 592-93 (stating that the trial judge must make a "preliminary assessment of
whether ... [the] reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in is-
sue").
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tion" thesis. 53
 In this case, the trial judge emphasized the language
that asserts that one must decide whether the expert is properly apply-
ing the scientific methodology and principles to the case at hand and
thus excluded the expert's testimony. 54 The court of appeals reversed,
putting emphasis on the methodology and not on the conclusions
drawn.55
 Either decision is reasonable but only one can be right. In
_pine); Chieffustice Rehnquist sided with the trial judge by stating that
"conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one an-
other."56
 This "not entirely" thesis was reinforced and given bite by the
following sentence: "A court may conclude that there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered."57
One should note that the expert did not use improper method-
ology in Joiner, so it would appear that the survey authors' focus on
methodology is too narrow a focus. The expert in Joiner based his
opinion on laboratory animal studies and epidemiological studies. 58
All of the judges who looked at the case agreed that this methodology
meets the test of "scientific." Yet this was not the problem; the prob-
lem was the "analytical gap." 59
Unfortunately, the true import of Joiner is less than clear because
the procedural posture of the case was a peculiar one. The precise
issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the court of appeals
had used the proper standard to review the district court's decision to
exclude the expert.° The court of appeals thought that it should re-
view what the trial judge had done "de novo," i.e., it should ask
whether the trial judge got it right. 6t The U.S. Supreme Court dis-
agreed, saying that the customary standard for reviewing evidentiary
rulings, which should be followed, was "abuse of discretion," i.e., one
should ask whether the trial court was in the ball park.° Conse-
quently, one could easily be puzzled by how seriously one should take
the Joiner opinion.
53 See 522 U.S. at 144-45.
54 Id. at 140.
55 Id. at 140-41, 146.
58 Id. at 146.
57 Id.
58 522 U.S. at 144-45.
59 See id. at 146.
89
 Id. at 138-39.
81 See id. at 143 ("[T[ he Court of Appeals erred in ... applying an overly 'stringent' re-
view. . [and] failed to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-
discretion review.").
62 See id. at 141-13.
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This puzzle disappeared when the third case in the trilogy was
decided. The 1999 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael establishes that one must take the Joiner case very seriously
indeed, and the overall consequence is that one must give equal em-
phasis to all three cases in the trilogy if one is to understand the law. 65
We can start by noting that Kumho The begins by declaring that the
issue on which the six are focused—i.e., what is the difference be-
tween science and non-science?—is often unimportant for judging
the admissibility of expert testimony. 64 The trial judge must subject all
experts, whether they be scientific or not, to the "gatekeeping"
screening. 65 At the very outset of the opinion, Justice Breyer stated:
We ... conclude that a trial court may consider one or more
of the more specific factors that Daubert mentioned when do-
ing so will help determine that testimony's reliability. But, as
the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is "flexible,"
and Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor
exclusively applies to all experts or in every case. Rather, the
law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it
decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to
its ultimate reliability determination. 66
In Kumho Tire, an engineer had offered an opinion on how and
why a tire had failed, which was relevant to whether the failure was the
fault of the manufacturer in the case.° Justice Breyer restated his
opening theme in the following passage, in which he speaks to the
diversity of expert testimony:
Engineering testimony rests upon scientific foundations,
the reliability of which will be at issue in some cases. In other
cases, the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon per-
sonal knowledge or experience. As the Solicitor General
points out, there are many different kinds of experts, and
many different kinds of expertise. ... We agree with the So-
licitor General that "[t] he factors identified in Daubed may or
may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the
65 See generally Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137.
" See id. at 147 (concluding that Rule 702 "makes no relevant distinction between 'sci-
entific' knowledge and 'technical' or `other specialized' knowledge").
65 See id. at 148 (stating that Daubert "gatekeeping" is not limited to "scientific" knowl-
edge).
0 Id. at 141-42.
67 Id. at 143.
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nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the
subject of his testimony." The conclusion, in our view, is that
we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all
time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor
can we now do so for subsets of cases categorized by category
of expert or by kind of evidence. Too much depends upon'
the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue."
One could read Kumho Tire rather narrowly as saying that its lan-
guage only has relevance to people such as engineers; for "real science"
the four factors remain the key. But this seems erroneous. Whenever
science comes into the courtroom, it comes in not as pure theory, but
as applied science, and thus looks much like engineering. Why did this
bridge fall down? Is the blood found at the scene of the crime the de-
fendant's blood? And so forth. In all such cases, one travels a long path,
from pure theory down to a technician in the lab, and the expert in
court may combine theory, lab results, personal observations, informed
judgment and more so as to offer relevant and reliable opinions that
can aid the trier of fact. Justice Breyer was correct in believing that as-
sessing the use of science in the courtroom is both more complex and
more subtle than a focus on the four factors might suggest.
C. What Is the Problem?
Without questioning the need for judges to understand more
about science, we challenge the assumption that Daubert represents
the scientific enterprise. Accordingly, we question the twin notions (i)
that if judges clearly understood the Daubert guidelines (for example,
"falsifiability" and "error rate"), then they would possess scientific lit-
eracy, and (ii) that the problem of inconsistent admissibility decisions
is caused by the failure to understand the Daubert guidelines. Granting
that some recent cases clearly confirm that trial judges need more
understanding of the Daubert guidelines, many others confirm the
need to understand science as an enterprise with social, institutional,
and rhetorical features not captured in the survey authors' idealistic
picture of science.
Our recurring reference below to the social, institutional, and
rhetorical features of science, as opposed to its methodological fea-
tures, merits a preliminary explanation. Social aspects of science in-
68
 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150 (quoting Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae 19)
(other citations omitted).
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dude its communal, rather than individualistic, structures such as his-
torical background, experimental conventions, shared standards of
legitimacy; negotiation and consensus-building techniques, and the
notion of an audience that evaluates the production of knowledge.
Science's institutional features, which are also social, include training,
credentializing, and gatekeeping by way of granting degrees, posi-
tions, funding, or publicity. The rhetorical features of science include
its narrative and textual aspects, such as techniques of persuasion,
governing metaphors, and linguistic conventions. Although these so-
cial, institutional, and rhetorical aspects often fade into the back-
ground by a focus on methodological features such as testing or rates .
of error, there is no reason to assume that they are dispensable or in-
significant in the final methodological analysis. Indeed, methodology
relies on social, institutional, and rhetorical conventions. Significantly,
however, there is no reason to assume that simply because of these
social, institutional, and rhetorical features, "nature" or "reality" has
nothing to do with scientific knowledge. Then again, the understand-
able sense that one must choose between a "social" and a "natural"
explanation for scientific progress, which we deem a false dualism,
helps explain why the social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of
science often are not discussed in Daubert Trilogy jurisprudence.
Throughout this Article we focus on recent federal appellate
court opinions reversing or rejecting a trial judge's decision on admis-
sibility of an expert. In some cases, the judge allowed scientific testi-
mony that the appellate panel found inadmissible, and in others the
trial judge disallowed testimony found on appeal to be admissible. 69
These types of cases, we believe, usually generate more careful and
detailed opinions than do affirmances." Our brief analysis of each case
69 Our research methodology was simply to read all the federal cases applying Daubed
in which a circuit court reversed a district court judge's decision on admissibility of an
expert. We wanted to identify and focus on cases concerning reliability; therefore we did
not consider the numerous cases concerning relevance (i.e., determinations that the evi-
dence would not assist the trier of fact), the distinction between lay and expert testimony,
or the danger of prejudice outweighing probative value, or of jury confusion. We also did
not consider cases where (i) the trial judge failed to hold a Daubcrt hearing, and (ii) the
trial judge made no findings that indicated why an expert's testimony was admitted or
disallowed. Finally, we eliminated some cases concerning reliability if that issue was so
mixed with other issues (for example, relevance) that the finding of reliability (or unreli-
ability) was not determinative. In short, the recent cases analyzed in this Article are those
where a primary disagreement between the trial judge and the appellate panel over the
reliability of an expert is both identifiable and discussed in the appellate opinion.
7° We are sympathetic to the charge that an empirical analysis of published case law is,
by its very nature, restricted to an analysis of post hoc justifications 	 and does not fully
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identifies the "problem" with the trial judge's understanding of sci-
entific expertise, as explained by the appellate panel. Specifically, we
ask whether a lack of understanding of the Daubert guidelines caused
the problem, or whether there was a failure to understand the social,
institutional, or rhetorical aspects of science. The mixed results of our
analyses suggest that an understanding of science includes both an un-
derstanding of the methodological aspects of science, exemplified in
the Daubert Trilogy and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 and an under-
standing of the social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of science.
II. PRAGMATISM IN LAW/SCIENCE RELATIONS
A. What Is "Pragmatism"?
We recognize that our use of the term "pragmatism" to denote a
trend is problematical in at least three senses. First, and most obvi-
ously, defining pragmatism as an orientation or approach is as
difficult as defining "formalism" or "realism." Anthony D'Amato at-
tempts to introduce legal pragmatism, in his Analytic fulisprudence An-
thology, by offering helpful excerpts from John Dewey, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Richard Rorty, Richard A. Posner, and his own work72—Pos-
ner's is particularly familiar and succinct:
Pragmatism in the sense that I find congenial means look-
ing at problems concretely, experimentally, without illusions,
with full awareness of the limitations of humari reason, with a
sense of the "localness" of human knowledge, the difficulty of
translations between cultures, the unattainability of "truth,"
the consequent importance of keeping diverse paths of in-
quiry open, the dependence of inquiry on culture and social
institutions, and above all the insistence that social thought
capture the judicial decision-making process." Gatowski et al., supra note 20, at 434. We be-
lieve, however, that more of the "judicial decision-making process" is revealed in reversals.
71 See FED. R. EVID. 702 ("[A] witness qualified as an expert ... may testify ... if (1) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods relia-
bly to the facts of the case.").
72 See ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY 219-48 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1996); see
also Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1569 (1990) (including article's by Thomas C. Grey, Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spel-
man, judge Richard A. Posner, Hilary Putnam, Margaret Jane Radin, Catharine Wells, and
Cornel West, as well as commentary by Scott Brewer, Mari j, Matsuda, Frank Michelman,
Ruth Anna Putnam, Richard Rorty, Joseph William Singer, and Marion Smiley).
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and action be evaluated as instruments to valued human goals
rather than as ends in themselves."
Interestingly, Posner associates pragmatism with the "scientific spirit ..
of inquiry, challenge, fallibilism, open-mindedness, respect for fact, and
acceptance of change."'" The paradoxical "respect for fact" alongside
"open-mindedness" hints at a pragmatic perspective on science as nei-
ther realist (facts equal nature) nor relativist (facts as merely social con-
structs), but oriented to local; practical problem-solving.
Second, the implied rejection by pragmatists of over-arching
theoretical frameworks destabilizes any attempt to define pragmatism
as a theoretical framework. In D'Amato's formulation: "It's hard to
define Pragmatism, and well it might be, because Pragmatists dislike
definitions. Definitions are themselves formal, suggesting logic and
exactitude. . . . A definition, to a Pragmatist, is just a rule of thumb."'"
D'Amato's introduction to pragmatism is thus itself pragmatic—a
matter of tendencies that can only be captured in specific solutions to
particular problems.
Third, because we want to distinguish a pragmatic perspective on
science from philosophical or legal pragmatism generally, we need to
construct that pragmatic perspective even though there is no unified
view among philosophers of science as to what pragmatism in science
entails. Thomas Nickles, for example, reads Kuhn's paradigm theory:
7,1 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 465 (1990), quoted in
ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY, supra note 72, at 239.
74 Sec POSNER, supra note 73, at 465.
75 ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY, Supra note 72, at 219 (D'Amato's introduc-
tion to Chapter 6, the readings on Pragmatism). The problem of defining pragmatism is
echoed in H.S. Thayer, Pragmatism, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 430, 431 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967):
In addition to some uncertainty as to the facts in the evolution of pragma-
tism [the familiar origin story is that Charles Peirce, William James, and oth-
ers founded the 'Metaphysical Club" in . the 1870s at Cambridge], there are
... several problems of interpretation. Peirce and James often gave very dif-
ferent accounts of what they understood by "pragmatism."....
[P]ragmatism, by virtue of being an evolving philosophical movement, is
to be viewed as a group of associated theoretical ideas and attitudes devel-
oped over a period of time and exhibiting ... rather significant shifts in di-
rection and in formulation....
Schiller, in an almost intoxicating pluralistic spirit, commented that there
were as many pragmatisms as there were pragmatists
Id.
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as retreating from a realist, "Truth Now" account to a sort of
pragmatism in which the solved problem rather than the true the-
ory becomes the unit of achievement in science.... [Kuhn's}
stress on the local contexts of research and the constraints they
impose on thought and action are very important."
Michael Ruse identifies his own tendency to be "somewhat of a prag-
matist, a nonrealist of a kind," as he thinks "[to] advance means get-
ting one's theory more in tune with epistemic values like consilience
than progress towards knowledge of a metaphysical reality." 77 Finally,
Karin Knorr-Cetina, a sociologist of science, considers the focus on
scientific practices, in contrast to producing normative philosophy of
science or "rational accounts" of theory choice, to be pragmatic—her
statement that "you don't always try to find the mechanisms behind
things without considering what is on the surface" characterizes her
position." These aphorisms, by emphasizing local practices and con-
texts instead of global reality or truth, are useful in our own assess-
ment of a pragmatic trend in law/science relations.
B. Resnik's Proposal for Pragmatic Decision Making
We should also distinguish our use of the term from that of David
Resnik, who recently proposed a pragmatic approach to the demarca-
tion problem (i.e., how to distinguish science from non-science), and
even offered it as a framework for judicial analyses of scientific valid-
ity." Resnik confirms that the demarcation problem remains a site of
controversy not only among historians, philosophers, and sociologists
of science, but also in practical settings such as the use of scientific
testing in the courtroom. 8° Positivistic verifiability criteria gave way to
Popper's falsification thesis—scientific theories are testable—but crit-
ics argued that this thesis does not provide conditions that are neces-
sary or sufficient for classifying statements as scientific. 81 Resnik then
briefly surveys historical, sociological, political, psychological, and
76 See WERNER CALLEBAUT, TAKING THE NATURALISTIC TURN, OR How REAL PHILOSO-
PHY OF SCIENCE Is DONE 53 (1993) (interview with Nickles).
" See id. at 469 (footnote omitted) (interview with Ruse).
" See id. at 120-21 (interview with Knorr-Cetina).
79
 See generally David B. Resnik, A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem, 30A
STUD. HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 249 (2000).
8° See id. at 249-50.
al Id. at 253. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
	 the Court cited Popper in
support of "testability," the first prong of the four-part test (testability, low error rate, pub-
lication, and general acceptance). See 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citation omitted).
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epistemological approaches, none . of which develop "necessary and
sufficient conditions for distinguishing between science and non-
science."82 Science, he concludes, cannot be defined in this way, be-
cause "[w]e distinguish between science and non-science in the con-
text of making practical decisions and choices." 83 Resnik states that
"to distinguish between science and non-science, we must know who is
seeking to make the distinction and why. ... We can reject some
definitions because they do not do a good job of promoting our goals
and interests ...."84 In the legal system, a conservative and rigid
definition of science, emphasizing reliability and rational consensus,
seems to set useful limits on the costs and durations of trials, and to
prevent mistakes such as wrongful convictions; but that definition
"might prevent an innocent person from gaining access to theories,
concepts, and data that could exonerate that person:Pm In any event,
we should "evaluate definitions of science in light of their probable
effects on justice, due process, efficiency, and other goals of the legal
system."88 . If that sounds relativistic, Resnik does not claim that the
definition of science rests only on practical concerns:
There are some common themes that should run through
these different definitions of science,   [including] testabil-
ity, empirical support, progressiveness, problem-solving ability,
and so on.... [O]ne can hold that there are some general
criteria for distinguishing between science and non-science
while holding that particular judgments depend on con-
textual features, such as practical goals and concerns. 87
Resnik's proposed pragmatism is similar to, but does not quite capture,
the pragmatic view of science that we identify in recent federal cases
applying Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
C. Courts Adopt Scientific, Not Legal, Pragmatism
Resnik seems to be recommending pragmatism on the part of
judges when they choose their definition of "science"—they should
"evaluate definitions of science in light of their probable effects on
92 Resnik, supra note 79, at 254-57.
a' Id. at 258.
94 Id. at 262.
95 Id. at 263.
86 Id. (citations omitted).
97 Resnik, supra note 79, at 264.
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justice, due process, efficiency, and other goals of the legal system." 88
Thus, in Resnik's account, they might choose a rigid, conservative view
of science, or a more liberal one that emphasizes "problem-solving
ability, testability, or other, less rigid criteria." 89
 Resnik's argument is
reminiscent of social constructivist arguments in the wake of D au-
bert—consider Margaret Farrell's argument that law should construct
its own truths rather than follow scientific constructs, because in each
field facts serve different purposes.9° That style of pragmatism, what-
ever its merits, does not seem to be in fashion among federal judges.
Rather, judges seem to be adopting a pragmatist view of the scientific
enterprise—naturalistic but representational, useful but model-based,
rigorous but approximate, social (institutional, rhetorical) but empiri-
cal, evidence-based but probabilistic. That framework, and its contrast
with,both (i) an idealized (i.e., realist, verificationist, or rationalist) view
of science and (ii) Resnik's pragmatically constructed "legal" science,
will become clearer in our analysis of some recent cases.
1. Medical Diagnosis Often Relies on Patient Reports, Not Objective
Measurement Techniques
In Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co., a case brought by an injured
worker seeking damages for an accident at a construction site, the
plaintiffs medical experts relied on the plaintiffs statements about his
past medical history as the basis for their diagnosis. 91
 The trial court
decided the testimony was not admissible "because the physicians had
an inadequate foundation"—no "scientific basis"—"for evaluating the
cause of Mr. Cooper's injury."92
 The court of appeals reversed, finding
the district court "assumed an overly aggressive role as 'gatekeeper":
Tin clinical medicine, the methodology of physical examination and
self-reported medical history employed by Dr. Richardson is generally
appropriate.... [The defendant] suggests no alternative that could be
employed by the conscientious clinical physician in this situation."98
Whether the doctor failed to consider other factors in the plaintiffs life
related to "the onset of the condition," and whether the medical his-
tory was accurate, are both "quite susceptible to exploration on cross-
examination"; they go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testi-
" See id. at 263.
59 Id.
90
 See Farrell, supra note 9, at 2204-05.
9 1
 211 F.3d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000).
92 See id. at 1012, 1019.
99 Id. at 1019-20.
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mony.94 The methodology of a physician employing "the accepted di-
agnostic tool of examination accompanied by physical history as related
by the patient" was acceptable under Daubert.95 The appellate panel in
Cooper therefore emphasized the actual practices of clinical physicians
rather than setting up, as the trial judge did, an idealized "scientific ba-
sis" as a standard to be met. Sometimes the data relied upon by experts
comes from interviews, and as long as that is a "'standard investi-
grat[ing] technique'" in the field—as in arson cases—we should not
demand more.96
2. Science Involves Uncertainty, Teamwork, and Alternative
Explanatory Models
In Walker v. Soo Line Railroad Co., an appellate panel likewise fo-
cused on the actual practices of experts to reverse a trial judge's exclu-
sion of testimony as lacking a scientific basis. 97 The plaintiff, Richard
Walker, claiming injury on a tower during an electrical storm, tried to
introduce the testimony of three experts: Dr. Pliskin (a psychologist),
Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer (an expert on electrical trauma), and Dr.
Uman (an expert on electrical safety). 98 Dr. Pliskin's evaluation of the
decline in Walker's Intelligence Quotient (IQ) was excluded at trial
because Pliskin "relied on the medical, educational and professional
histories reported by" Walker and his girlfriend, some of which the trial
judge found to be inaccurate. 99 The appellate panel, however, noting
that "[m]edical professionals reasonably may be expected to rely on
self-reported patient histories," found Pliskin's scientific methodology
acceptable under Daubert (and again, that any inaccuracies could be
, tooexplored on cross-examination.) 	 Moreover, the defendant's argu-
ment on appeal that Dr. Pliskin's testimony was inadmissible because he
did "not state definitively that the electrical trauma caused the drop in
Mr. Walker's IQ" was rejected, suggesting that admissible testimony
fo a at 1020-21.
95 Id. at 1021.
96 See Cooper, 211 F.3d at 1020 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lundy,
809 F.2d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that arson experts regularly rely on interviews
with witnesses to investigate the cause and origin of fires)).
97 208 F.3d 581, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2000).
98 Id. at 585.
99 Id. at 586.
No Id.
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(which might be useful to the jury) does not imply certainty as to ulti-
mate issues.'"
Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer's testimony was also excluded, seemingly
because she relied "on the work of her team members in forming her
opinion" that Walker suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. 1 °2
The appellate panel again found that practice to be common: "Medical
professionals have long been expected to rely on the opinions of other
medical professionals in forming their opinions.... Indeed, courts fre-
quently have pointed to an expert's reliance on the reports of others as
an indication that their testimony is reliable." 103 The appellate panel
also rejected the defendant's argument that Capelli-Schellpfeffer's tes-
timony was unreliable because she relied on Pliskin's work but dis-
agreed with his conclusion: "That two different experts reach opposing
conclusions from the same information does not render their opinions
inadmissible. 'Merely because two qualified experts reach directly op-
posite conclusions using similar, if not identical, data bases ... does not
necessarily mean that, under Daubert, one opinion is per se unreli-
able.'"104
 Finally, the appellate panel confirmed that, although Capelli-
Schellpfeffer was not a psychiatrist, her testimony about post-traumatic
stress disorder was admissible because she was the leader of a clinical
medical team:
The team approach to medical diagnosis and treatment is em-
ployed to ensure that all relevant disciplines work together for
the good of the patient. The leader ... reconcile [s], when nec-
essary, competing perspectives. In short, the expertise of the
team leader is the capability to evaluate, in light of the overall
picture, the contributions of each member of the team. 105
That picture of experts from various disciplines with "competing per-
spectives," each of whom offers limited contributions, portrays sci-
ence as not only "methodological," but also as social, institutional,
and rhetorical. 106
"I See id. at 587.
102 See Walker, 208 F.3d at 588. We say "seemingly" excluded because the district court's
statement of its reasons" for exclusion were "not stated with optimal clarity." Id.
.10 Id. (citing Birdsell V. United States, 346 F.2d 775,779-80 (5th Cir. 1965)) (footnote
and other citations omitted).
104 Id. at 588-89 (quoting Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1335,
1341 (S.D. Fla. 1999)).
1°5 Id. at 589.
106 See id.
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The trial judge in Walker also barred the testimony of Dr. Uman-
concerning the different ways that lightning could have penetrated
the tower in which the plaintiff was stationed—as too speculative. 107
The appellate panel, however, found his testimony scientifically valid,
because "[e]xperts are allowed to posit alternate models to explain
their conclusion."' 08 All of these conclusions by the court of appeals
regarding Walker's experts suggest that the trial judge mischaracter-
ized the scientific enterprise as a field of objective measurement,
definitive (or non-contradictory) conclusions, individual achieve-
ment, and singular explanatory models; for the appellate panel, how-
ever, the practices of experts often involve data from subjective narra-
tives, an inability to conclude (and even contradictory conclusions),
teamwork, and alternative explanatory models. Like the pragmatists
that they are, scientists work with what they have, and with others, to
produce the best and most useful knowledge.
3. Science Is Probabilistic, Not Certain
In Jahn v. Equine Services, PSC, a veterinary malpractice case, the
plaintiff's experts could not "identify with any degree of certainty the
specific physiological cause" of a race horse's death, and one of them
lacked relevant surgical experience. 1 °9 The trial judge therefore ruled
their testimony inadmissible under Daubed, but the appellate panel
held that "the district court's Daubed analysis both mischaracterized
the methodology employed" by the experts "and ultimately employed
a standard of admissibility more stringent than that expressed in Rule
702.""° The court then stated:
In order to be admissible on the issue of causation, an ex-
pert's testimony need not eliminate all other possible causes
of the injury.... Daubed and Rule 702 require only that the
expert testimony be derived from inferences based on a sci-
entific method and that those inferences be derived from
the facts of the case at hand .... 111
Because the defendants' medical records were not complete,
Idertainty is not to be found in this case."112 Although the district
107 208 F.3d at 585.
1°8 Id. at 589,
1°9 233 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2000).
no Id. at 389.
111 Id. at 390. (citations omitted).
114 Id. (emphasis added).
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court viewed the experts' testimony as 'stacking one guess on top of
another,'" both experts (by necessity) "based their opinions on the
facts with which they were presented." 115 If the trial judge would have
explored whether the testimony reflected 'the same level of intellec-
tual rigor that characterizes'" veterinary practice, it would have been
clear that the experts "used a methodology derived from scientific
medical knowledge, although limited by the information provided to
them." 1 " Moreover, the trial judge's , suspicion of testimony that con-
tradicted a pathologist's report was inappropriate: "Metermining
which is more credible should be left for the finder of fact and should
not be considered when ruling on Rule 702 admissibility." 115 Finally,
looking at "test results and physical symptoms to infer the presence of
an infection is not a methodologically unsound 'assumption' or
`guess'—it is a diagnosis." 116 Here again, compared to the trial court's
image of scientific knowledge, the view of the appellate court seems
deflationary—sometimes science is less than certain, sometimes scien-
tists necessarily piece together a probable series of events under less
than ideal circumstances, and sometimes their admissible conclusions
are shaky, challengeable, or less persuasive than at other times. 117
4. Not All Scientific Knowledge Is Peer Reviewed and Published
In Smith v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiff proposed to call two ex-
perts to support his claim that the steering mechanism in his van mal-
functioned, causing an accident. 118 The district court concluded (i)
that neither was qualified to testify, because they were not automotive
engineers, and (ii) that their methodologies were unreliable because
they had not been peer reviewed. 113 On the first point, the appellate
panel held that, although their expertise did not concern the ultimate
issue, which could require an automotive engineer, their expertise
nevertheless could be "relevant to evaluating" other factual matters.'"
On the second point, peer review, the appellate panel held that "the
district court did not indicate whether publication is typical for the
113
 Id. at 391 (quoting Joint Appendix at 57D).
n4 Jahn, 233 F.3d at 391 (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152
(1999)).
116 Id.
116 Id.
117
 See id. at 392-93.
116 215 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2000).
116
 Id. at 720.
12° Id.
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type of methodology these experts purported to employ. The district
court merely recited the failure of the experts to publish and con-
cluded that their testimony was unreliable." 12t The key issues for the
appellate panel were whether (i) "well-established engineering prac-
tices" were applied, and (ii) the methodology was based on "extensive
practical experience," not whether "a single, potentially irrelevant, cri-
terion" was met.'" Ideally, publication in peer-reviewed journals is
relevant, but the actual practices "in the relevant engineering and ac-
cident analysis communities" is sometimes more relevantio Again,
the . trial judge's idealization of formal scientific practices eclipsed any
inquiry into how experts actually work.
5. The Limitations of Social Science Do Not Make It Unscientific •
Finally, in United States v. Sinithers, the district court excluded the
testimony of Dr. Fulero, an expert on eyewitness identification, on the
basis that his opinion was not scientifically valid. 124 A divided appellate
panel reversed, confirming that psychological studies of the limita-
tions of perception and memory in eyewitness identification are now
a "scientifically sound and proper subject of expert testimony. " 25 The
strong and lengthy dissenting opinion in support of the trial judge's
skepticism is interesting because of its criticism not only of research
on the deficiencies of eyewitness identification but also of social sci-
ence generally:
The trepidation with which nearly all appellate courts have
treated [expert testimony on eyewitness identifications] is
representative of a broader reluctance ... to admit the expert
testimony of social scientists with the same deference given to
the testimony of those in the physical' sciences.. ..
[D]isagreements between dueling experts in the physical sci-
ences ... typically focus on the data ... which [are] subject to
objective analysis. The certainty of the testimony of social sci-
entists, however, is limited by the nature of their field. 126
A majority of the panel, however, was less reluctant, which suggests less
idealism concerning the hard sciences together with a pragmatic accep-
121 Id.
122 Sec id. at 720-21.
123 Smith, 215 F.3d at 721.
124 212 F.3d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 2000).
126
 Id. at 313.
126 Id. at 327-28 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
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lance of the limitations of the social sciences. Science is not character-
ized by its certainty, but rather its methodology; conclusions are often
tentative, contradictory, probabilistic, or impossible under the circum-
stances. These do not signal unreliability, but rather are the typical
conditions under which scientists work to produce useful knowledge.
The foregoing five cases each involved a trial judge whose deci-
sion not to admit certain expert testimony was reversed. We have also
introduced our argument that the misunderstandings on the part of
the trial judges were not primarily methodological, but rather
reflected misunderstandings as to the social, institutional, and rhe-
torical aspects of science. Of course, we concede that some recent
cases exemplify the need for trial judges to better understand sci-
entific methodology. For example, the trial judge in Hardyman v. Nor-
folk & Western Railway Ga., a Federal Employers' Liability Act suit
based on a carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) injury, excluded the testi-
mony of the railroad worker's experts on causation. 127 One such ex-
pert, Dr. Linz, employed differential diagnosis methodology—consid-
ering all potential causes of symptoms and then (by tests and
examinations) eliminating likely causes until the most probable one is
isolated—to reach his conclusion that plaintiff's CTS was caused by
work activities. 128 The trial judge, after acknowledging the acceptabil-
ity of differential diagnosis, "failed to recognize that Dr. Linz applied
[that] method ... [and] seemed actually to reject this method."'"
The appellate panel therefore reversed, "convinced that the rationale
of the district court did not justify exclusion of Plaintiff's expert tes-
timony."150
In contrast to the trial judge in Hardyman, who did not recognize
or accept sound methodology, the trial judges in the five cases we dis-
cussed above exemplify a different problem, which might be called the
idealization of scientific methodology. That is, the reason those judges
did not recognize the practical goals and limitations of science—its re-
liance on self-reported medical history, uncertainty, competing expla-
nations, and conventional practices—was their idealized image of the
features of the scientific enterprise: objective measurement, definitive
conclusions, and unanimous consensus in peer-reviewed publications.
This idea that trial judges should have a somewhat deflated image of
science might, we understand, sound counterintuitive. It would seem
127 243 F.3d 255, 257 (6th Cir. 2001).
128 Id. at 261.
in Id. at 262.
138 Id. at 267.
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that to appropriate the best science in law, judges should set a very high
standard. Because we want to challenge that notion, we turn now to six
recent cases that specifically highlight the problem of idealizing sci-
ence, namely that this approach may keep the best science out of the
courtroom. Again, in all of these cases, trial judges were reversed by
appellate panels who understood the social, institutional, and rhetori-
cal context of expertise.
For example, in Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., a products liability action
against the manufacturer of a paver, the plaintiff's safety expert was
excluded because the trial judge found that "'his opinion is simply
not competent under Daubert . . . [—i.e.,] it is not supported by
sufficient testing, experience, background, education, or thought." 131
The appellate panel, however, was "persuaded that [his] testimony .. .
was reliable . . . because it was the result of his having researched and
applied [well-accepted] standards [in the engineering cornrnu-
nity]."132 The trial judge's comments that the expert's opinion was
"'very limited,'" and "'backed by very little work and very limited ex-
pertise,'" suggest that the judge wanted more "science" than this ex-
pert could offer; the appellate panel's reaction was to look at what the
"community" of such experts thinks and does.'" Expertise thus
reflects a social practice, not just an abstract methodological ideal.
Indeed, even methodological ideals are local and dependent on the
relevant community's standards. Thus, in Charles Alan Taylor's for-
mulation, an empirical conclusion by a scientist "is itself pragmatically
contingent on wider configurations of practices":
My point here is not that all interpretations of the facts are of
equal legitimacy. ... [but we should reject the] claim that the
relative legitimacy of a given interpretation is a natural condi-
tion of the material to be interpreted, rather than a function of
an audience's [for example, a scientific community's] evalua-
tions of the evidence adduced on its behalf ... . 1"
151 Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083,1086 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
928 (2002) (mem.) (quoting Appellant's App. at 8-9).
t32 See id. at 1088.
iss See id. at 1086-88 (quoting Appellant's App. at 8-9).
134 Charles Alan Taylor, Feuding Communities and the Feudalism of Science: Democratizing the
Community and/of Science, in RHETORIC AND COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN UNITY AND FRAG-
MENTATION 284,288-89 ( J. Michael Hogan ed., 1998).
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Recourse to the social and institutional aspects of science, in contrast
to abstract ideals, is also evident in five more cases where a trial
judge's idealizations of science were corrected.
In United States v. Finley, the trial judge in a criminal trial excluded
the defendant's psychological expert's testimony on the basis that
"'the testimony would not be helpful to the jury.'" According to the
appellate panel, the trial judge "seemed troubled by the fact that the
psychological tests did not reveal a conclusive diagnosis," and by the
fact that the expert "based his opinion on his belief that [the defen-
dant] was not faking or being deceptive." 136
 The expert even admitted
at the Daubert hearing that his diagnosis was "'extremely gray.'" 197
 Re-
versing the conviction, the appellate panel implied that the trial judge
was asking for too much:
It appears from the record before us that [the expert]
based his diagnosis on proper psychological methodology and
reasoning.... [He] did not base his conclusions solely on
[the defendant's] statements; rather, he used his many years
of experience . . .
... Based on his clinical experience and [the] facts, [the ex-
pert] concluded that [the defendant] was not faking or lying.
A belief, supported by sound reasoning, ... is sufficient to
support the reliability of a mental health diagnosis....
... We have recognized that concepts of mental disorders
are "constantly-evolving conception [s]" about which "the psy-
chological and psychiatric community is far from unanimous"
138
• .	 •
Here again is a picture of science as inconclusive, based on reasonable
belief, evolving, and subject to internal disagreements; this is not,
however, a critical assessment of scientific reliability, but an acknowl-
edgment that science is a social enterprise with institutional supports
155
 301 F.3d 1000, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing trial court's ruling that expert
testimony was not needed because "the jury could independently determine [the defen-
dant's] credibility"). A second ground for exclusion, not discussed here, was as a sanction,
but the trial court held that either basis was sufficient to exclude the testimony. See id.
In Id. at 1008.
Iv Id. at 1012.
158 Id. at 1009, 1011, 1012 (last alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Rahm,
993 F.2d 1405, 1411 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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(for example, standardized diagnostic categories) and debates that
betray rhetorical strategies of persuasion.
Trial judges who want more from science, we might say, need to
understand more about its limitations, and their exclusive focus on
idealized methodological aspects—like "testing" or "data"—might be
misleading them. For example, in Pipitone v. Biomatiix, Inc., a patient
who contracted a salmonella infection after receiving a knee injection
brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of the
synthetic fluid Synvisc. 133 At trial, the testimony of an infectious dis-
ease expert was disallowed as unreliable because (i) no epidemiologi-
cal study was performed, (ii) no published study supported his opin-
ion, and (iii) other potential sources for an infection had not been
eliminated. 140 As to the first statement, the appellate panel agreed
with the expert that an epidemiological study "is not necessary or ap-
propriate in a case such as this in which only one person is in-
fected."141 As to the lack of peer-reviewed literature supporting the
expert's opinion, the appellate panel observed that where:
there is no evidence that anyone has ever contracted a salmo-
nella infection from an injection of any kind into the knee, it is
difficult to see why a scientist would study this phenomenon.
We conclude ... that the lack of reports ... supparts, rather
. than contradicts, [the expert's] conclusion that the infection
did not arise due to	 [a] source not related to Synvisc. 142
Even the third concern, that other sources were not eliminated, was
rejected by the appellate panel: "[The expert] methodically elimi-
nated the alternative sources of the infection as viable possibilities.
After doing so, he stated that he was `99.9%' sure that the source of
the salmonella was the Synvisc syringe: 443 Significantly, the expert
seemed to fare badly under the four Daubert guidelines: (i) he "did
not test his hypothesis," (ii) "no known or potential rate of error or
controlling standards [were] associated with [his] hypothesis," (iii)
there was no "relevant scientific literature," and (iv) only his diagnos-
tic principles, not his particular hypothesis, were "generally accepted
in the relevant scientific community."144 Nevertheless, the appellate
159 288 F.3d 239, 241 (5th Cir. 2002).
140 Id. at 245.
141 Id. at 246.
144 Id.
143 Id. at 248.
144 See Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 245-46.
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panel deemed it "appropriate for the trial court to consider factors
other than those listed in Daubert to evaluate ... reliability .... In this
case, the expert's testimony is based mainly on his personal observa-
tions, professional experience, education and training. "145
A similar evaluation by an appellate panel appeared in Furry v.
Bielomatik, Inc., where a safety engineer's testimony was excluded be-
cause he did not offer specific .
 designs for safety features that he
identified as necessary. 1" The appellate panel vacated the summary
judgment because the trial court's evaluation "appears to have been
based upon an overly expansive view of [the expert's] role as a safety
expert, as well as an overly technical application of the factors articu-
lated in ... Daubert." 147 In Pipitone and Furry, the Daubert guidelines
emerge as ideals that must be mediated by pragmatic concerns—
every hypothesis will not have been the subject of extensive testing,
well-established standards or error rates, peer-reviewed publications,
or even consensus (except in the most general sense of consensus re-
garding methodological principles).
Two other recent cases also highlight the limitations under which
science pragmatically, though not ideally, operates. In Lauzon v. Senco
Products, Inc., the district court excluded the testimony of a forensic
engineer who testified often in pneumatic nail gun cases. 149 The trial
judge found that (i) the testing of the expert's theory was inadequate
(the expert was unable to duplicate the events of the accident on
which the case was based), (ii) the relevant peer-reviewed literature
was inadequate, (iii) the expert's theory was not widely accepted, and,
impliedly, (iv) the expert's research was not sufficiently independent
of litigation. 149
 The appellate panel found the expert's testing and the
literature (and therefore general acceptance) sufficient, but also ob-
served that the expert's involvement with past litigation did not infect
his research: 199
 "[T]he slight negative impact of [the expert's] intro-
duction to the field of pneumatic nail guns through litigation is out
 Id. at 247.
146
 No. 01-55442, 2002 WI, 464607, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
886 (2002) (mem.).
147 Id.
148 270 F.3d 681, 685 (8th Cir. 2001).
149 See id. at 688-92.
1" See id. An expert's finding that flows from research independent of litigation is less
likely to be biased and the expert is limited to 'the degree to which he can tailor his testi-
mony to serve a party's interests.'" Id. at 692 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S RE-
VENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 206-07 (1991))).
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weighed by his independent research, independent testimony, and
adherence to the underlying rationale of the general acceptance fac-
tor, scientific reliability."151 General acceptance cannot be found for
every reliable hypothesis, nor can many reliable hypotheses be found
outside the litigation context. Moreover, as explained in Metabolife In-
ternational, Inc. v. Warrick, a study commissioned by a party, not sub-
jected to peer review, and incomplete, is not by those facts alone ren-
dered unreliable: "Rather than disqualify the study because of
'incompleteness' [—the overall project was ongoing, but all of the
relevant data had been gathered in final form—] or because it was
commissioned by Metabolife, the district court [on remand] should
examine the soundness of the methodology employed." 152
These cases suggest that science is not pure—there is always
funding from somewhere, and there is always a social or contextual
reason to study something. In Pipitone, there was no reason to study
salmonella knee infections until the injury occurred; in .Furry, there
was no history of extensive testing, and therefore no well-established
error rate or consensus, concerning the safety of "paper converting"
machines; and in Lauzon and Metabolife, the relevant research was
driven by litigation—these do not signal unreliability, but rather con-
stitute social, institutional, and rhetorical features of science. In effect,
the trial judge in each of these cases understood the methodological
ideals of science, but not:its historical, communal, and economic di-
mensions. To the extent that the trial judges at least recognized these
social features of science, they were viewed as problems or impurities
rather than conventions or inevitabilities—that is what we mean by
the tendency to idealize science. Although no one doubts that the sci-
entific enterprise rests on historical, social, institutional, and rhetori-
cal structures, some trial judges tend to see methodology as a check
on their effects. The notion that methodology itself is social or rhe-
torical is therefore counterintuitive.
Judicial idealization of science, in each of the cases just discussed,
resulted in reversals because the experts, engaged in a pragmatic en-
terprise with practical goals and limitations, did not live up to the trial
judge's ideals. In the next Part, we discuss a parallel problem: trial
judges are ofteh reversed for deferring to the social authority of ex-
perts, even when the experts lacked methodological reliability. As we
will show, the debate about whether judges should defer to science
151
 Id, at 693.
152 264 F.3d 832, 843 (9th Cir. 2001).
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out of ignorance, or, conversely, should demand that experts educate
the judge, is not new We argue that when trial judges understand the
social, and not just methodological, authority of science i. as. well as the
potential disconnect between social authority and reliability, they tend
to adopt an educational model of their gatekeeping responsibilities.
III. AN
 EDUCATIONAL, NOT DEFERENTIAL, MODEL OF
LAW/SCIENCE RELATIONS
A. Are Judges Equipped to Judge Science?
I think that judges can become "comfortable" with science or scientists if
they know more about how they operate. . . . Mhere has been this notion
that science is beyond us, in another world entirely, and that we cannot
handle it. I just do not buy that idea." 3
The above remark, made by Chief Judge Markey at a conference
on science, technology; and judicial decision making over twenty-five
years ago, anticipated the turn in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. toward a more active gatekeeping role for judges with respect to
expert scientific testimony. 15" Indeed, the notion that judges under the
Frye v. United States155
 regime routinely deferred to scientists is belied by
the proceedings of that conference, which could easily be mistaken for
a contemporary discussion of the problems of how to define science,
the distinction between hard and soft science (as well as between sci-
entific and non-scientific expertise), the differences between the legal
and scientific enterprises with respect to standards of proof, and the
perceived need for science advisors or panels to aid judges in their
evaluatiOns of experts.' 56
 Nevertheless, one recurring theme in the con-
ference, expressed by Chief Judge Bazelon and others, was that judges
are not equipped to handle scientific and technical disputes:
155 Remarks by Chief Judge Howard T. Markey, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING: AN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION 12 ( J.D. Nyhart ed., 1981) (edited tran-
scription of the proceedings of the Sept. 23-29,1977 Conference on the Use of Scientific
and Technical Evidence in Formal judicial Proceedings, prepared for the National Science
Foundation by the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology) (hereinafter DtctsioN: MAKING).
154 Sce id.
155 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
136
 See generally DECISION-MAKING, supra note 153.
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It is hard to imagine a less likely forum for the resolution of
technological disputes than our trial courts. Participation in
litigation is controlled by the parties who call the witnesses.
The information is developed by rules and the strict admis-
sion of evidence. The finder of fact, whether it be a judge or
a jury, obviously has no claim to expertise in resolving the
scientific questions ... . 157
Judge Spaeth agreed that "judges are starting to become very uncom-
fortable about whether they are being asked to make decisions that really
they should not be asked to make because they are not well equipped to
make them," 168 which skepticism was echoed by Chief Justice Rehnquist
in Daubertm and by some commentators after Daubert. 16° hi retrospect,
however, Chief Judge Markey's optimism has prevailed: "We need to de-
velop some understanding of scientists and scientific methods—how they
think, how they work, how they arrive at this view and do not arrive at
that one.... I think judges have to learn that scientists do not have two
heads. They are not ten feet tall." 161 An educational, not deferential,
model is suggested here for law/science relations.
B. Do *Federal Rules of Evidence Encourage Deference or Education ?
On the eve of the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dauber',
Ronald J. Allen and Joseph S. Miller summarized the ongoing debate
over "deference or education?" regarding experts, and tentatively
concluded that an education model was preferable if not exclusive. 162
Allen and Miller reformulated the debate between Ronald Carlson 163
and Paul Rice 164—over whether the facts or data grounding an ex-
pert's opinion should be admissible (Rice) or not (Carlson)—as one
over "the extent to which they are willing to defer to experts": 166
157 Remarks by Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, DEctsioN-MAKING, supra note 153, at 14.
158 Remarks by Judge Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., DECISION-MAKING, supra note 153, at 17.
1" See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist, Ci.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1" See, e.g., Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Sci-
ence Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REv. 803, 815-17.
161 See Markey, supra note 153, at 12.
162 See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or
Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1131, 1137 (1993).
168 See generally Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND,
L REV. 577 (1986).
164 See generally Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony:
A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1987).
188 See Allen & Miller, supra note 162, at 1136.
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Carlson's fact finder ... can only attach value to the expert's
opinion on the basis of that expert's perceived credibility;
the restriction on basis testimony, then, functions to turn the
expert into a "super-fact finder capable of producing admis-
sible substantive evidence (an opinion) from inadmissible
evidence." Rice prefers that the fact finder be allowed to
hear and to use the facts or data that support the expert's
opinion to the same extent that the expert uses them. 166
Professor Rice, in short, is not as deferential as Professor Carlson. Pro-
fessor Imwinkelried's position in the debate, building on Judge
Learned Hand's suggestion (in 1901) that experts inform the jury of
general principles to apply to facts, is strikingly deferential to scientists
(though not with respect to the facts of a case). 167 Allen and Miller, in
response, highlight the problem of conflicting expert testimony,' not-
ing that Faye provided a check on irrational choices between experts:
[A] system designed to encourage education has considera-
bly less need of such a check, for the check will come from
the pedagogical process itself. Ai the fact finder becomes in-
formed about an area of knowledge, charlatans will be ex-
posed. The Federal Rules thus do not embrace Frye just be-
cause they are considerably less dedicated to deference than
their common law predecessors. Education is clearly permit-
ted, perhaps encouraged .... 169
Finally, Allen and Miller criticize Peter Huber and Richard Epstein as
overly deferential to science, the latter of whom (prior to Daubed)
questioned the idea that the Federal Rules do not adopt the deferen-
tial perspective of Fa :y. 17°
166 Id. at 1135 (quoting Rice, supra note 164, at 586).
167 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 'Bases' of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1988).
I66 Allen & Miller, supra note 162, at 1140.
169 Id. at 1142 (footnotes omitted).
170 See id. at 1142-46 (citing Richard A. Epstein, A New Regime for Expert Witnesses, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 757, 758-60 (1992); Peter Huber, funk Science in the Courtrooni, 26 VAL. U. L.
REV. 723, 745 (1992)); see also Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Control over Expert Testimony: Of
Deference and Education, 87 Nw. U. L REV, 1156, 1158 (1993). "Learned opinion is divided
on the subject of the status of Frye under the Federal Rules of Evidence]." Id. at 1158 n.9.
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C. The Trilogy Offers an Educational Model
Without revisiting the disputes over the proper interpretation of
Frye, one of the sensible readings of that opinion would be that judges
in that regime were to decide two questions, one normative and one
empirical."' First, is the witness representing a group worthy to be
called scientists (for example, astrologers: no; chemists: yes)? if that
normative question can be answered affirmatively, then the empirical
question is'whether the proffered testimony represents that which is
generally accepted in the field. If so, then the judge defers by declaring
the testimony admissible. 172 As to what the jury does with that testi-
mony, Frye does not address whether the jury is then educated by or
deferential to the expert. Trial lawyers presenting' such testimony ob-
viously want both—a deferential jury that understands and is per-
suaded by the testimony. As to whether the judge was exercising a
"gatekeeping" function under Frye (by asking a normative and an em-
pirical question), the Daubert Trilogy confirms that a more aggressive
gatekeeping function is now required of federal judges. Dauber! held
that Frye did not survive the Federal Rules, 173 and in General Electric Co.
v. Joiner, the Court observed that "nothing . . . requires a district court
to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by
the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply
171 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (The scientific principle "from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.").
172 As others have pointed out, the Frye "test" (which many states still use) has (level:
oped in recent decades into numerous tests, some of which are less deferential and involve
more scrutiny of an expert's testimony. Sec David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, '
Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 Juana-rams J. 385, 386-87 (2001)
("Many jurisdictions continue to adhere to Frye „ ."); id. at 388 ("IC]ase law under Frye is
slowly converging with Dauber: jurisprudence"); id. at 393 ("Courts in Faye jurisdictions are
beginning to hold that an expert's methodology and reasoning should be scruti-
nized"); id. at 404 ("Frye courts are stretching Frye beyond its original boundaries in a
struggle to keep up with Supreme Court precedents"). Consequently, it is improper either
to refer to Frye as outdated or to view its general acceptance test as somehow fixed. See
Pamela J. Jensen, Note, Frye Versus Daubert: Practically the Same?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1579,
1580-81 (2003). One survey of state court opinions concerning the admissibility of several
types of scientific evidence found that:
although states vary widely in how they treat certain types of scientific evi-
dence, this variation does not correlate with the adherence to Frye or Dauber,
admissibility standards. The inherent ... breadth of the inquiries compatible
with either standard permits widely variable opinions concerning admissibility
of a single scientific methodology.
Id. at 1619.
172 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
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too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion prof-
fered."174 That sentence was quoted approvingly in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, just after the Court explained that:
no one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from
a set of observations based on extensive and specialized ex-
perience. Nor does anyone deny that, as a general matter,
tire abuse may often be identified by qualified experts . .
[But] the question before the trial court was specific, not
general[:] [W]hether this particular expert had
sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors "in decid-
ing the particular issues in this case." 175
The best way to read the excerpts, we believe, is that judges should
not admit an expert's testimony unless the judge understands its
logic, which implies education by the expert as a prerequisite to ad-
missibility. In several recent cases, that emphasis on the educative role
of experts recurs.
1. Judges and juries Need to Understand the Expert
In Elcock v. Kmart Corp., a case involving injuries sustained by a de-
partment store patron, the trial judge admitted the testimony of Dr.
Copemann, an expert in vocational rehabilitation, and Dr. Pettingill, an
economist. 176 As to Dr. Copemann, the appellate panel . held that the
trial judge should have held a Dauhert hearing—an understandable er-
ror before Kumho Tiro—and that "a fuller assessment of Copemann's
analytical processes" would have revealed its weaknesses.'" Specifically,
Copemann's methodology in reaching a conclusion of the plaintiffs
50-60% disability was neither testable nor reproducible; at best, it was a
novel synthesis of two widely used methods, but Copemann "did not
demonstrate that this hybrid approach bore a logical relationship to"
the established techniques. 178 "Nor, looking at Copemann's description
of his methodology," did it seem to the appellate panel that a reason-
able explanation could be provided.'" Because of the disconnect be-
174 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
175 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999) (citation omitted)
(quoting 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 702.05[1], at 702-33 ( Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1998)).
176 233 F.3c1 734, 738 (3d Cir. 2000).
177 Id. at 744-45.
178 Id. at 747-48.
179 Id. at 750.
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tween the stated nature of Copemann's methods and the results they
produced when the facts of the case were "plugged into their machin-
ery," the appellate panel hesitated to find Copemann's method reli-
able.' 8° Copemann.seems to have made a "subjective judgment ... in
the guise of a reliable expert opinion," which, in the terminology of
Joiner and Kumho Tire, is an "ipse dixit statement." 181
As to Dr. Pettingill, the appellate panel likewise scrutinized his
testimony on earning capacity, and found that his conclusions were
based on faulty assumptions—for example, that Elcock was 100% dis-
abled, that she would have earned twice her pre-injury earnings but
for the injury, that she had no post-injury income (she did), and that
her life expectancy was average (she had diabetes). 182 In a lengthy
footnote exploring the "interstitial gaps among the federal rules," the
court explained:
[A] lost future earnings expert who renders an opinion
based on economic assumptions not present in the plaintiff's
case cannot be said to "assist the trier of fact," as Rule 702
requires.... [Moreover,] it is not a stretch from the [Rule
703] requirement that other "experts in the particular field"
would "reasonably rel[y]" on such data in "forming opinions
... on the subject" to suggest that an expert should not de-
pend on fictional or random data .
... Rule 402 sets forth a liberal admissibility standard for
"[all relevant evidence," defined in Rule 401 as "evidence
having any tendency" to make "more probable or less prob-
able" the existence "of any fact ... of consequence . ..."
Under this framework, an economist's testimony concerning
a reliable method for assessing future economic losses can
be deemed relevant only insofar as a jury can usefully apply
that methodology to the specific facts of a particular plain-
tiff's case. 183
Elcock thereby provides an educational model both for judges applying
the testability standard when conducting a Daubert hearing
(Copemann's testimony) and for juries applying an expert's method-
ology to the facts (Pettingill's testimony).
100 Id.'
181 See Elcock, 233 F.3d at 747, 748.
182 Id. at 755-56.
188 Id. at 756-57 n.13.
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2. Credentials Are Not Enough
In Goebel v. Denver es' Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., the district
court admitted the testimony of Dr. Daniel T. Teitelbaum, who "pur-
ported to establish a causal link between" the plaintiff's cognitive
brain damage and his exposure to diesel exhaust in a train tunnel. 184
The defendant on appeal characterized Teitelbaum's testimony as
"'relying solely upon the ipse dixit of the expert,'" and because- the dis-
trict court did not hold a Daubert hearing or make specific findings on
the record regarding Teitelbaum's reasoning and methodology, the
appellate panel found an abuse of discretion in admitting the testi-
mony. 185
 In short, the trial judge should not have deferred to even a
credentialed expert's belief that "on the basis of ... fundamental
physiology," the cognitive defect was caused by exposure to pulmo-
nary irritants at high altitude which produced swelling in the brain.'
The gatekeeping role requires, in various formulitions, that district
courts "vigilantly make detailed findings," that they "carefully and me-
ticulously" review the proffered scientific evidence. 187
3. General Acceptance Is Not Enough
Finally, Libas, Ltd. v. United States, which reviewed a trial court's
determination concerning the weight rather than the admissibility of
expert testimony, is significant because it confirms that general accep-
tance or widespread use—the proxy for reliability under Frye's defer-
ential regime—is not enough to signal reliability under Daubert. 188 A
key issue at trial was whether a fabric was power loomed, and the trial
judge relied entirely on the results of a Customs Service test that was
generally viewed as accurate. 189
 The appellate panel held that the trial
court should have also taken into account testability, peer-reviewed
publications, potential rate of error, or other factors to "assure itself
that it has effectively addressed the important issue of reliability. "190
Once the reliability of a "generally accepted" technique is effectively
184
 215 F.3d 1083, 1085 (10th Cir. 2000).
185
 Id. at 1086, 1088 (quoting Appellant Br. at 20).
'86 See id. at 1086 (quotation omitted).
187 Id. at 1088 (citations and internal quotes omitted).
15a See Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
189
 Id. at 1365.
IN Id. at 1366-67.
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challenged, as it was by testimony that the fabric came from a village
in India with no power looms, a searching analysis is required. 191
Together, these cases represent a shift away from deference (to
conclusory opinions or "generally accepted" techniques) and toward
a pedagogical model for expert testimony: trial judges need to see
and understand the logic or reasoning—the connections—from prin-
ciple to application to conclusion, and juries need to apply method-
ologies to the facts before them.
D. The Social Authority of Science
What, then, do trial judges need to know about science to carry
out their gatekeeping responsibilities? Several recent federal cases,
again, support the. notion that trial judges need to be more rigorous in
applying the Daubert guidelines. In Ueland v. United States, for example, a
prisoner brought a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act for back
and neck injuries sustained in a collision between a prison van and its
"chase car." 192 The principal "medical" testimony came from "Jason
Wilson, a college dropout who claims to be a chiropractor with a prac-
tice limited to acupuncture." 193 The judgment in favor of the United
States was reversed on several grounds, among them that:
The district judge refused to apply Rule 702 or conduct a
Daubert inquiry, ruling instead that Wilson's lack of creden-
tials and experience concerns only the weight to be ac-
corded to his testimony. That ruling is wrong. On remand, a
Daubert inquiry must be conducted, and Wilson's testimony
may be received only if ... [his] "testimony is based upon
sufficient facts ... , the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and ... the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably „ . '194
Likewise, in Lloyd v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re Air Crash on. June 1,
1999), an airline passenger was awarded damages for injuries sus-
tained during an American Airlines crash. 199 The trial judge admitted
m Id. at 1365, 1368. Here, where Libas effectively challenged the reliability of the Cus-
toms procedure, the trial court should have examined the Customs test either with a Dan-
bera-style analysis or in some other equally searching way. Id. at 1368-69.
192 291 F.3d 993, 994 (7th Cir. 2002).
195 Id. at 997.
194 Id. (quoting FED. R. Evin. 702).
195 291 F.3d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Lloyd v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 537 U.S.
974 (2002) (mem.).
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the testimony of a Dr. Harris, who testified that the plaintiffs post-
traumatic stress disorder was due to a brain dysfunction, but who also
acknowledged that he did not carry out certain tests that would have
revealed biological changes in the plaintiffs brain.t 9" The appellate
court concluded that a Daubert issue was raised:
Unfortunately, the district court does not appear to have con-
sidered any of the Dauber/ factors .... The district court
merely noted that Harris was a qualified psychiatrist, and then
stated "It's beyond my competence. I don't know whether ...
there is research material that shows brain changes as a result
of this syndrome. This inquiry was not adequate to satisfy the
district court's essential gatekeeping rule under Daubert. 197
Because no tests were performed, "there was no connection established
between the alleged physical brain changes" and the plaintiff's condi-
tion. 198
Finally, in Boncher ex rel. Boucher v. Brown County, the estate of a
prisoner (who had committed suicide) brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action against jail officials alleging deliberate indifference to the risk
of the prisoner's suicide.'" The trial judge allowed a criminologist to
testify that the number of suicides in the defendant's jail was unusu-
ally high, but the appellate panel found that "his evidence was useless
and should have been excluded under the Daubert standard."2" In-
deed, the expert admitted "that he had neither conducted nor con-
sulted any studies that would have enabled him to compare the [de-
fendant's jail suicide rate with that of the free population in the
county or that of other jails." 201
 Such cases demonstrate the need for
trial judges to be more sophisticated regarding scientific methodol-
ogy, and perhaps even the need for more judicial training in science,
although Judge Posner in Boncher seized the opportunity in his opin-
ion to educate judges on the spot as to "normal variance":
I" Id. az 513.
197 Id. at 514 (quoting Tr. at 328).
198 Id. Dr. Harris "based his conclusion on [the plaintiff's] disrupted sleep, lack of
concentration and flashbacks. This was an inadequate foundation upon which to base the
opinion that a physical change had taken place in [the plaintiffs] brain." Id. at 514-15.
'99 272 F.3d 484, 485 (7th Cir. 2001).
2" Id. at 986.
"I Id. at 487. Note that the appellate panel affirmed the summary judgment in favor
of the defendant; we include this case as an example of a rejection of a trial judge's admis-
sibility decision notwithstanding affirmance of the trial court's judgment.
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It would not be sound to condemn a jail administrator if the
rate of suicide in his population was within one or two stan-
dard deviations of the rate elsewhere, for so small a variance
might well be due to chance, or at least to factors over which
lie had no control. Every statistical distribution has an upper
tail, and there is no constitutional principle that whoever is
unlucky enough to manage the prisons in the upper tail of
the distribution of suicides must pay damages.202
But then the recent decision in Chapman v. Maytag Corp. presents an
interesting contrast to the above three cases.203 The trial judge
seemed to understand quite clearly that a mechanical engineer's tes-
timony, in support of a wrongful death suit for electrocution by a
kitchen range, was less than scientific, but nevertheless the testimony
was allowed. 204 The trial judge found that the engineer "'failed to
specify the details supporting his opinion that [the deceased] would
have been electrocuted,' regardless of whether the outlet was properly
grounded. Moreover, the court stated that the lack of any scientific
testing presented a 'serious problem for the status of Ethel testimony
as expert opinion."208 A new trial was required because "the district
court failed to assess whether [the engineer's] theory is scientifically
valid," but the question remains why a judge who seemingly raised the
right questions—insufficient details supporting the opinion, lack of
any scientific testing—allowed the testimony. 206 Two other recent fed-
eral opinions provide a possible answer: the social and institutional,
not methodological, authority of science in law sometimes interferes
with judicial evaluations of experts.
In Elsayed Mnkhtar v. California State University, Hayward, a Title VII
suit by a professor alleging race discrimination in a denial of tenure,
the plaintiff presented Dr. David Wellman as an expert on racism.207
The district court admitted Dr. Wellman's testimony "without any dis-
cussion of its reliability," 208 and the jury awarded the plaintiff $637,000
in damages. 209 On appeal, in response to the plaintiffs argument that
it was harmless error to admit Dr. Wellman's testimony without a reli-
"2 See id.
202 See 297 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 2002).
2'°4 Id.
202 Id.
2" See id. at 686-87.
407 299 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cu. 2002), amended by 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003).
208
	 at 1064.
"17 Id. at 1061.
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ability finding (because six of plaintiff's colleagues testified that he
was qualified for tenure), the University's counsel argued that "Dr.
Wellman's testimony was not harmless because it was cloaked in
authority ," and that without his testimony, the plaintiffs "evi-
dence could show only [an evenly divided] difference of academic
opinion regarding his tenure qualifications."210
 The appellate panel
agreed and vacated the judgment, stating that "Dr. Wellman drew the
inference of discrimination for the jury . . . [which] 'more probably
than not was the cause of the result reached.'" 211 That notion of being
"cloaked in authority," even when there may be no reliability, high-
lights the potential disconnect between social (or institutional) author-
ity in science and methodological reliability, which the trial judge in
Elsayed Mukhtar perhaps failed to appreciate.
A similar misunderstanding appeared in finro America Inc. v. Secure
Investments, Inc., a breach of contract, fraud, and racketeering case in
which a purported expert on Korean culture and business practices
was allowed to testify. 212
 The appellate panel agreed with the plaintiff,
who lost at trial, that the expert's "ethnically biased, 'xenophobic' .
testimony" was "objectionable" and "completely improper." 213
 His
"sweeping generalizations, derived from his limited experience and
knowledge ... were unreliable and should not have been dignified as
expert opinion."2" But they were, because he "came before the jury
cloaked with the mantle of an expert. This is significant for two rea-
sons: First, it allowed him ... to couch his observations as generalized
'opinions' .... Second, ... his statements were likely to carry special
weight with the jury."215
 We think it is also significant that the appellate
panel did not limit their review to the methodological deficiencies—
there were many—of the purported expert in finro, but also discussed a
social and institutional aspect of science: its authoritative force, its
"cloak" and "mantle" that (due to science's epistemological status) can
sometimes get separated from its validity without awareness on the part
of the judge or jury.216 To understand science is to understand that
authority is not a "natural" phenomenon, but a rhetorical accomplish-
210 Id. at 1067.
2t1
 Id. at 1068 (quotinEdatiregui y. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 1988)).
2" See 266 F.3d 993, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on denial of reh'g by 272 F.3d 1289
(9th Cir. 2001).
213
 Id. at 996.
214 Id. at 1006.
213 Id. at 1004.
216 See id.
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ment on the part of those who study nature. At its best, science repre-
sents nature in compelling and useful ways, but to understand science
is to recognize that methodological advances can be lost without social
authority, as in the case of novel theories that have not yet (but should)
gain general acceptance; conversely, methodological mistakes can go
unnoticed because of social authority, as in the case ofJiuro.
For example, in Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, the Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) in a Black Lung Benefits Act case, reviewing a
Benefits Review Board order, was faced with conflicting evidence of
pneumoconiosis. 217 The pathologist performing the autopsy opined
that the miner had pneumoconiosis, but five other physicians dis-
agreed.218 The Aki placed . "`more weight on the opinion of the pa-
thologist who performed the autopsy,"219 but an appellate panel
found that decision irrational: "Although we understand why the AL.1
. . . wanted to avoid the medical controversy, . [a] scientific dispute
must be resolved on scientific grounds, rather than by declaring that
whoever examines the cadaver dictates the outcome."220 Although this
outcome on appeal can be explained as an example of a judge who
does not understand methodology, it is also an example of how social,
institutional, and rhetorical authority gets separated from methodo-
logical reliability: but for the appeal, the authority of the pathologist
was persuasive enough to establish pneumoconiosis.
The potential disconnect between social authority and methodo-
logical reliability is also significant for the debate over whether legal"
science is different from science itself. Because judges simply are not
scientists, or because the goals of litigation (for example, finality) are so
different from the goals of practicing scientists (for example, criticism
and refutation), some would argue that legal science is not the same as,
or never can be, genuine science. Indeed, our arguments about science
as a practice, for which automatic deference is inappropriate, might be
viewed as, the basis for an appeal to a "legally constructed" science
which would co-exist alongside "socially constructed" science. The third
trend that we briefly identify (in the next Part), however, is the ten-
117 255 F.3d 465, 467 (7th Cir. 2001).
2 ' 8 Id. "One of these [five] „ added that [the original pathologist's] analysis de-
pended on views expressed in a 1981 article that had been discredited in the medical lit-
erature, and that as a result [the original pathologist's] conclusion is worthless." Id.
219 Id. (quoting the Administrative Lawfudge).
220 Id. at 468 (citations omitted) ("[J]unk science cannot be rescued by some principle
such as a dodtrine that courts must receive the views of any expert who does hands-on
work.").
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dency to demand genuine science, with all of its own pragmatic limita-
tions, in court.
W. MERGING "LAW TALK" AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE
Recall Resnik's proposal that courts should choose their definition
of science on pragmatic grounds: criteria should match the goals and
concerns of the courtroom. 221
 This formulation implies that science's
own standards of validity should be different from legal standards of
scientific validity. Brian Leiter takes this position in his critique of Heidi
Feldman's argument that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ap-
propriately adopted a revised empiricist philosophy of science (thereby
bringing law into line with actual scientific practice) 
. 222 For Leiter, ad-
missibility criteria need not follow "the dominant, or even the correct,
philosophy of science": 223
Courtrooms, after all, are not laboratories, and judges are
not scientists.. . . The rules of evidence serve [not only the
discovery of truth but also] . . . the promotion of various pol-
icy objectives ... and the efficient and timely resolution of
disputes.. ..
We plainly want our science in the courtroom to bear
some relation to real science .... But this goal must be pur-
sued in light of the serious epistemic limits of courts--intel-
lectual, temporal, material. 224
Admissibility questions are, for Leiter, questions of social epistemol-
ogy: "[U]nder the real-world epistemic limits of a particular social
process for the acquisitiOn of knowledge, what epistemic norms actu-
ally work the best?"225
Again, that style of pragmatism, which inevitably presumes there is
some real laboratory science that never quite makes it into court, is not
the pragmatism we identified among federal appellate judges. Rather,
the view of real science itself as already a pragmatic practice—perhaps a
minor devaluation of science—is combined with an educational model
of what scientists do in court to create an actual scientific discourse in
221
 See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
222
 See Leiter, supra note 160, at 804-05 (citing Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncer-
tainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 -11x. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1995)).
223
 Id. at 805.
214
 Id. at 816-17 (footnotes omitted).
us Id. at 814.
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law. In effect, for these judges, science is not as complex, and courts are
not as limited, as Leiter suggests. Indeed, if scientific knowledge is al-
ways approximate and probabilistic, it is not so different from law. Sci-
ence, too, has, in Leiter's terminology, serious "intellectual, temporal,
[and] material" epistemic limitations. 226 Although some education is
necessary, and some translation warranted, the standards for science in
law are to mirror the standards for scientists generally. Courts therefore
generously cite Chief judge Posner's requirement "that when scientists
testify in court they adhere to the same standards of intellectual rigor
that are demanded in their professional work." 227
V. OVERCOMING THE METHODOLOGICAL/SOCIAL DICHOTOMY IN LAW
In any truly public battle, those arguing for constructivism in general
will lose to those arguing for reality in general. What is necessary is first an
at least rhetorical concession to the power of the argument for reality, and
second, a demonstration of the way particular uses of the constructivist po-
sition are humanly helpfitl and consistent with a rigorous science. 228
Although we will not attempt to introduce or revisit the polariz-
ing debates about the role of social interests in the production of sci-
entific knowledge, it is important to acknowledge that those debates
keep many historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science busy.
In the science wars, the "rational and the social are dichotomized and
the debate is about which ought to be given primacy in accounting for
scientific knowledge." 229 Sociologists of science, for example, identify
and emphasize "the practices and processes that . succeed in ratify-
ing some content ... as knowledge in a given community"—science is
"a process of developing . . . new accounts of natural processes in such
a way as to effect general assent to those accounts." 2" Unfortunately,
that emphasis seems to destabilize or undermine science as a reliable
source of knowledge, because of the overt dependency on "commu-
nity" or "general assent? Scientific representations, we might say,
226 See id. at 817.
227 Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996). A LexisNexis search
turned up hundreds of federal cases using this phrase, including Ku-mho Tire Co. v. Car.
michae4 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
22s George Levine, What Is Science Studies for and Who Cares?, 14 Soc. TEXT 113, 126
(1996).
2" See HELEN E. LONGiNO, THE FATE or KNOWLEDGE 77 (2002).
250 Id. at 78-79.
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should be caused by nature or reality, not by communal assent, and
certainly not by rhetorical techniques. A scientist's account might
therefore emphasize the processes and practices that justify knowl-
edge "independently of community practices":
One can speak of the knowledge of an individual as the in-
tersection of what the individual believes (justifiably) and
the set of all truths [for example, concerning nature], or the
knowledge of a community as the intersection of what is ac-
cepted (justifiably, or as a consequence of normatively sanc-
tioned practices) by a community at a time with the set of all
truths. 23 i
Unfortunately, again, that emphasis on "truth" seems to idealize sci-
ence by ignoring the historical evolution of scientific knowledge as
well as the social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of "justification"
and "normatively sanctioned practices."
Numerous theorists have concluded, therefore, that the choice
between a view of science as fundamentally "social" (or cultural) and
as fundamentally "rational" (or methodological) is a false dualism.
Helen Longino, for example, concedes that justification is contextual,
but need not be arbitrary or subjective, as it is "dependent on rules
and procedures immanent in the context of inquiry. Contextualism is
the nondichotomist's alternative to [sociological] relativism and [ra-
tionalistic] absolutism regarding justification." 232
 Bruno Latour argues
that "scientific facts are indeed constructed, but they cannot be re-
duced to the social dimension"—networks of scientific knowledge are
"simultaneously real, like nature, narrated, like discourse, and collective, like
society."2" In another formulation, Slavoj Zizek asks: "[I]s historicist
relativism (which ultimately leads to the untenable solipsist position)
really the only alternative to a naive realism (according to which, in
the sciences ... , we are gradually approaching the proper image of
the way things really are out there, independently of our conscious-
ness of them) ?"234 What is missed in that dichotomy, Zizek suggests,
was indicated by Thomas Kuhn when "he claimed that the shift in a
scientific paradigm is MORE than a mere shift in our (external) per-
spective on/perception of reality, but nonetheless LESS than our ef-
"I Id. at 83-84.
232 Id. at 92 .
235
 BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 6 (Catherine Porter trans., 1993).
2" See Slavoj Zizek, Loran Between Cultural Sradies and Cognitivism, in LACAN & SCIENCE
291,299 ( Jason Glynos & Yannis Stavrakakis eds., 2002).
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fectively 'creating' another new reality." 235 Although such notions are
complex and sometimes counterintuitive—hence the tendency to-
ward false dichotomies—they are particularly useful in explaining
some of the confusion in Daubert Trilogy jurisprudence. The inevita-
ble social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of science are not the
opposite of scientific methodology; they provide its context.
In our analysis of federal appellate court opinions, we identified
various instances where trial judges did not appreciate the social, in-
stitutional, and rhetorical aspects of science. In reversing district court
admissibility decisions, the appellate panels identified the social
authority of scientists that can interfere with methodological evalua-
tions, as well as the pragmatic limitations on science that arise, for ex-
ample, due to the fact that not all hypotheses are the subject of well-
established standards, past research interests, or extensive testing. The
"mantle of authority" is not a marker of reliability, but neither are the
pragmatic limitations on science markers of unreliability. Science is a
network of communities, institutions, persuasion, and consensus-
building; methodological norms can sometimes provide a check on
these features, but such norms are also part of the network.
CONCLUSION
Determining just what constitutes a sufficient level of scientific undentand-
ing for the judiciary is a question forfitture study and policy development. 236
Why do trial judges governed by the Daubert Trilogy need to un-
derstand the social, institutional, and rhetorical—and not just the
methodological—aspects of science? First, if they are unduly focused
on methodological factors, they risk idealizing science and conse-
quently keeping reliable science out of court because of its pragmatic
goals and limitations. Second, they risk deferring to science and con-
sequently allowing unreliable science into court because of its social
authority, which authority does not necessarily signal reliability. Third,
by making such mistakes, they risk constructing a legal science that is
out of sync with mainstream science. Conversely, an appreciation, of
the inevitable social, institutional, and rhetorical features of the sci-
entific enterprise, as well as the methodological ideals of that enter-
prise, helps judges (i) to recognize reliable science even when it ap-
235
 Id. at 300.
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 Gatowski et al., supra note 20, at 455.
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pears as a demystified practice, (ii) to recognize unreliable science
even when it appears as authoritative, and (iii) to appropriate science
itself, and not a legalistic shadow of science, into court.
Relying primarily on recent federal appellate opinions that re-
versed trial judges' evaluations of admissibility of scientific evidence, we
identified three tendencies in the wake of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc.: (i) a pragmatist orientation with respect to ongoing
philosophical disputes concerning the nature and reliability of the sci-
entific enterprise; (ii) an orientation to an educational, rather than a
deferential, model of the relationship between science and gate-
keeping judges; and (iii) a merger of legal and scientific discourse, that
is, a tendency to resist the notion that, in determinations of validity, law
and science operate on justifiably different grounds. We conclude that
these trends ought to lead away from false dichotomies: between nature
and culture, between methodology and social contexts, and even be-
tween "genuine" and "junk" science when experts disagree.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 702
state that:
When facts are in dispute, experts sometimes reach differ-
ent conclusions based on competing versions of the facts.
The emphasis in [Rule 7021 on "sufficient facts or data is
not intended to authorize a trial court to exclude an expert's
testimony on the ground that the court believes one version
of the facts and not the other. 237
Although the foregoing might seem obvious, the court of appeals in
Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc. viewed the trial court's exclusion of the plain-
tiff's infectious disease expert as "the precise problem" identified
above. 238
 Perhaps there is a tendency in law to see every dispute as
having two sides, only one of which will win. Perhaps it is a "scientis-
tic" culture, and not legal culture, that is responsible for the sense
that when two scientific experts disagree, one 'of them must be unreli-
able. Scientific debate, however, can:
be understood as an ongoing process of critical interaction
that both prevents closure where it is inappropriate and helps
to establish the limits of (relative) certainty ..
2" FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
438 See Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249 (5th Cir. 2002).
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. . . I 1.1 t makes no sense to detach measurements and data
descriptions from the contexts in which they are gener-
ated[.] [A] s soon as one does, one creates a new context
relative to which they are to be assessed and understood. 239
Again, however, the sense in scientistic culture that "contexts" are
unstable leads some consumers of science, including trial judges, to
want more than social authority, institutional gatekeeping, and rhe-
torical ornaments—they want reality. Indeed, that distinction between
"context" and "reality" gives the social, institutional, and rhetorical
features of science a pejorative connotation. Science should, we might
say, represent nature, not funding interests, lofty credentials, commu-
nal assent, or good argumentative techniques. The same distinction, a
false dualism, has made its way into training manuals for attorneys
who cross-examine experts—bias, interests, and motivations are bad,
which implies that genuine expertise is .unbiased, disinterested, and
unmotivated. Although it is true that some experts may be biased to-
ward a pet theory, financially invested in their client's cause, or moti-
vated by greed, the very notion of disembodied, detached, asocial,
and acontextual science is a product of an unjustified dichotomy. Fi-
delity on the part of scientists to contemporary methodological con-
ventions is a bias, an interest, and a motivation—but that is what we
want. Moreover, involvement on the part of scientists in the social,
institutional, and rhetorical features of their profession can help them
generate reliable science—and that is also what we want.
2/9 LONGING, supra note 229, at 197, 201.
